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The most radical component of China’s Open Door economic policy in the late 1970s 
was its encouragement of joint ventures and other foreign direct investment (FDI).  
Although scholars have studied the impact of the new policy on China’s economy and 
on the global economy, few have considered the background of the reforms.  Drawing 
from relevant American business archives, contemporary news reports, and other 
primary sources, I argue that China’s reforms in 1979 were likely influenced by three 
important dynamics:  contributions of American joint ventures and other FDI to 
China’s economically successful neighbors in East Asia and the attractiveness to 
China’s reformers of enabling similar contributions in China; contributions of 
American joint ventures and other FDI to the Eastern European countries aligned with 
the Soviet Union, coupled with China’s competition with the Soviet Union for 
expanded economic relations with the U.S.; and interactions between American 
leaders and businesspeople with Chinese counterparts. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
“We do not allow foreign capital to exploit China’s resources nor do we run joint 
enterprises with foreign countries, still less beg them for foreign loans.”   
(Peking Review, 1977)1 
 
“After the smashing of the Gang of Four, the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party formulated the policy of opening to the outside world and of 
introducing foreign investments.  Thus the purchase of advanced foreign technology, 
machinery and equipment has developed into the acceptance of foreign loans and then 
into permission for foreign firms to build factories or establish joint ventures with 
China on Chinese soil within prescribed limits.  As an important measure to 
accelerate the four modernizations, this will also enhance our capabilities to build the 
country through self-reliance.” 
(Chinese Economist Xue Muqiao, 1986)2 
 
 
 China launched dramatic and wide-ranging changes in its economic policies 
beginning in 1978 in a comprehensive effort to improve its domestic economy, 
increase per capita income, improve its standing in the world economy, modernize its 
agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology (called “the Four 
Modernizations”), and strengthen its geopolitical security.  Reforms dramatically 
changed many aspects of China’s economy, marking China’s efforts to turn away 
from the central planning-dependent economic model of the Soviet Union.  For 
example, market demand began to supplement central planning.  Farmers were 
allowed to grow more food than required by the central plan and keep or sell the 
surplus.  Some state-owned enterprises were privatized.  Some administrative 
authority was decentralized.  Capital allocation by the state planning administration 
                                                
1 Peking Review, No. 9, February 25, 1977, p.18, as quoted in Margaret Pearson, Joint 
Ventures in the People’s Republic of China: The Control of Foreign Direct 
Investment Under Socialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 51. 
2 Xue Muqiao, China’s Socialist Economy, rev. ed. (Beijing: Foreign Languages 
Press, 1986), 244. 
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was shifted to encourage more production of consumer goods and less spending on 
heavy industry.  Incentives were developed to reward workers for their output rather 
than rewarding all workers from the same “iron rice bowl.”  Most importantly, 
China’s leaders announced a new willingness to import new methods and technology 
from foreign suppliers in order to accelerate China’s modernization, which became 
known as its new “Open Door policy.”3     
The most revolutionary of the changes brought by the new Open Door policy 
was the adoption in 1979 of the new “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Joint 
Ventures” that allowed jointly owned business enterprises, commonly called joint 
ventures, between Chinese and foreign firms.4  In addition to joint ventures, which are 
a form of foreign direct investment (FDI), the new Open Door policy also allowed 
other forms of FDI in order to draw foreign investment capital into China.  Historian 
Margaret Pearson noted, “As part of this new ‘open’ policy, China embarked on a 
strategy to use private foreign capital to spur economic development.”5  Scholars 
Samuel P.S. Ho and Ralph W. Huenemann explained that the essence of this new 
policy was “a quest for accelerated economic development through the adaptation and 
diffusion of foreign technology,” and they argue, “There was nothing new in China’s 
desire to modernize.  What was new was the announcement that China would turn to 
                                                
3	  Samuel P.S. Ho and Ralph W. Huenemann, China’s Open Door Policy: The Quest 
for Foreign Technology and Capital (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1984), 1-13.	  
4 Otto Schnepp, Mary Ann Von Glinow, and Arvind Bhambri, United States-China 
Technology Transfer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), 18. 
5 Margaret Pearson, Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China, 3. 
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Western developed economies for advanced technology and assistance to achieve its 
objectives.”6  
China’s changes in policy converged with a twenty-year trend of increased 
activity in joint ventures and foreign direct investment in both developed and 
developing countries around the world by American firms.  The reforms in China 
were highly complementary with the changes that had occurred in the American 
business community.   The American shifts were outwardly directed, seeking 
opportunities for American capital and technology outside of the United States.  The 
Chinese reforms were inwardly focused, seeking to draw in foreign capital and 
technology.  This convergence powerfully altered the industrial activity and 
economics of both countries.  Following the reforms in China, the United States 
accelerated its transition in the 1980s and 1990s to deindustrialization, off-shoring 
manufacturing to foreign locations including Chinese joint ventures, and subsidiaries 
in China of U.S.-based corporations.  China transitioned from a poor, inwardly 
focused nation to a global superpower, fueled by exports manufactured with foreign 
technology.  Was this an “accident of world-historical significance” as Professor 
David Harvey postulated, or did the joint venture and foreign direct investment 
activity of American companies in the 1960s and 1970s influence the change that 
occurred in China in 1979?7  This thesis investigates how the activities of American 
business enterprises in Asia and the Soviet Bloc leading up to 1979 likely influenced 
China’s policy changes.  A definitive answer might only be determined by accessing 
                                                
6 Ho and Huenemann, 7. 
7 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), 120. 
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personal diaries and the Chinese archives that document the thoughts of the Chinese 
reformers and the internal deliberations between the reformers prior to the policy 
changes, but that research is not possible at this time.  Drawing from relevant 
American business archives, contemporary news reports, and other primary sources, I 
argue that China’s reforms in 1979 were likely influenced by three important 
dynamics:  contributions of American joint ventures and other FDI to China’s 
economically successful neighbors in East Asia and the attractiveness to China’s 
reformers of enabling similar contributions in China; contributions of American joint 
ventures and other FDI to the Eastern European countries aligned with the Soviet 
Union, coupled with China’s competition with the Soviet Union for expanded 
economic relations with the United States; and interactions between American leaders 
and businesspeople with Chinese counterparts. 
Because the economic reforms in China resulted in enormous global 
implications, scholars have published detailed analyses of the changes in policy.  
Many studies address the impacts of the changes in China’s policies on China’s 
economy, on the global economy, and on China’s relationship with other countries, 
including the United States. However, most of these studies begin their analysis in 
1978, when the first policy changes were announced and implemented and do not 
investigate the influences that led to the reforms, or they discuss the background of 
the reforms only briefly and narrowly.8  
                                                
8 Peter J. Buckley, Foreign Direct Investment, China and the World Economy (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Galina Hale and Cheryl Long, Foreign Direct 
Investment in China: Winners and Losers (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific 
Publishing, 2012); Ho and Huenemann, China’s Open Door Policy; Yasheng Huang, 
FDI in China: An Asian Perspective (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1998); 
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Historian James Z. Gao argued that the threat posed by the Soviet Union to 
China’s security caused China to pursue rapprochement with the West after 1969 and 
to accept the terms of normalization in relations offered by the United States in 
December 1978.9  I argue that Soviet access to superior American technology through 
technology transfer during the period of détente posed a threat to China’s security 
throughout the 1970s and that this likely influenced China’s decision to open China to 
participation in joint ventures and FDI in 1979 with American firms.  
Gao also argued that Deng Xiaoping drove China’s Open Door reforms in 
order to gain access to advanced Western science and technology.  I fully agree that 
gaining access to advanced technology was one of the primary motivations for the 
Chinese reforms, but I argue that evidence suggests that Deng wanted to gain access 
specifically to American technology to support the modernization of China’s 
agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. 
Historian Harry Harding noted that economic liberalization in Eastern Europe 
after 1976 influenced the Chinese reformers.  He attributed the mutual interest by the 
Chinese and Eastern Europeans in reforms to a shared orientation toward loosening of 
controls in the Soviet economic model.  Harding recognized the Chinese reformers’ 
desire for increased importation of Western technology, but he did not acknowledge 
                                                                                                                                      
Robert Kleinberg, China’s “Opening” to the Outside World: The Experiment with 
Foreign Capitalism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Richard D. Robinson, ed., 
Foreign Capital and Technology in China (New York: Praeger, 1987); Haishun Sun, 
Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China: 1979-1996 (Brookfield, 
VT: Ashgate, 1998).  A brief but helpful background summary is provided in Phillip 
Donald Grub and Jian Hai Lin, Foreign Direct Investment in China (New York: 
Quorum Books, 1991). 
9 James Z. Gao, “Rediscovery of Western Science and Technology and Definition of 
Chinese Foreign Policy,” China Studies 6 (2000): 29-48. 
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that the Eastern European economic liberalization experiments included the 
allowance of joint ventures and FDI with foreign firms.10  
Political scientist Margaret Pearson argued that Chinese reformers considered 
the successful experiences with joint ventures of some of the Eastern European 
countries aligned with the Soviet Union, specifically Hungary, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia, as well as South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, but she did 
not explore the highly visible role of American companies in those economies.  She 
included Sun Yat-sen’s and Lenin’s perspectives on the use of foreign capital as part 
of the background rationale for the Chinese economic reforms, but she did not include 
China’s awareness of contemporary, 1970s-era East Asian and Eastern European 
exposure to foreign capital and technology, particularly from the U.S.11  
Similarly, political scientist Nina P. Halpern noted that several Chinese 
delegations visited Eastern Europe, particularly Yugoslavia and Romania, starting in 
January 1977 to study their economic policies and experiences.  Press articles 
appeared in China beginning in 1977 that highlighted the beneficial impact of joint 
ventures on Hungary’s economy, and similar articles appeared in 1978 and 1979 
highlighting joint ventures and the use of foreign capital in Romania and Yugoslavia.  
Halpern noted that one of the five criteria that were highlighted as success factors in 
the economies of Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania was “a policy of self-reliance 
combined with importing of advanced techniques from the West.”  She credited the 
Chinese exposure to these experiences as influences on China’s reforms, arguing, 
                                                
10 Harry Harding, China’ Second Revolution: Reform After Mao (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1987), 48. 
11 Pearson, Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China, 53, 251 fn54. 
 7 
 
“The examination of East European methods of interaction with the capitalist 
economies no doubt was an important source of ideas as China gradually expanded its 
own repertoire of such methods.”12  Halpern’s work valuably confirmed that the 
Chinese reformers learned from the Eastern European experiences with joint ventures 
and foreign technology in the late 1970s as the Chinese economic reforms were 
developed and launched.  However, she did not consider the experiences of these 
specific East European economies with American technology transfer, joint ventures, 
and direct investment. 
Presidents Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State 
Kissinger described in their memoirs the bitter and sometimes violent relationship 
between China and the Soviet Union in the 1970s and efforts at détente between the 
United States and the U.S.S.R.13  Most valuably, Kissinger argued in his recent On 
China that China’s rapprochement with the United States in the early 1970s was 
driven by China’s desire to strengthen its security against the Soviet Union, not by 
trade considerations.14  None of these works, however, investigated the possible 
influence that booming trade between the United States and the U.S.S.R., and in 
particular, efforts by American companies to establish joint ventures in Soviet Bloc 
countries for the transfer of technology, had on China’s 1979 reforms. 
                                                
12 Nina P. Halpern, “Learning from Abroad: Chinese Views of the East European 
Economic Experience, January 1977-June 1981,” Modern China 11, no. 1 (January 
1985): 93-94. 
13 Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 
1978); Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam 
Books, 1982); Jimmy Carter, White House Diary (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2010); Henry Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1979); Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999); 
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982). 
14 Henry Kissinger, On China, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 2012). 
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Strongly influenced by the humiliation imposed on China by foreign 
imperialists in the second half of the nineteenth century, Mao Zedong stressed the 
importance of Chinese self-reliance and he firmly resisted foreign influence in China.  
Mao launched the violent and chaotic Cultural Revolution in 1966 to stimulate “class 
struggle” and to persecute those who were taking the “capitalist road.”  Many 
scholars have documented the extremely negative influence of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution on economic and technological progress in China in general, and on 
economic reforms specifically.  Deng Xiaoping, who eventually became the leader of 
China after Mao’s successor Hua Guofeng, considered reforms in 1975 that would 
facilitate faster acquisition of foreign technology in order to accelerate China’s 
modernization but political rivals aligned with the Cultural Revolution crushed his 
efforts, and he was temporarily exiled from power.15  The Cultural Revolution ended 
only with Mao’s death in 1976.16  Historian Ezra Vogel argued that the attainment of 
power by reformers Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping after Mao’s death, and after the 
extreme Communist nationalists known as the “Gang of Four” were stripped of 
influence in 1977, explains why China’s economic reforms were launched in 1978 
and 1979 and not earlier.17  However, although a masterwork and comprehensive in 
its examination of Deng’s role in the economic reforms, Vogel’s book did not discuss 
                                                
15 Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 37; Joseph Fewsmith, Dilemmas of 
Reform in China: Political Conflict and Economic Debate (Armonk, NY: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1994), 59; Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982) 
(Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1984), 44. 
16 John K. Fairbank, “The People’s Republic,” in East Asia: Tradition and 
Transformation, ed. John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, 
rev. ed.  (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1989), 967-971. 
17 Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press, 2011).   
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the possible influence of the U.S. businesses that actively sought entry into China 
beginning in the early 1970s on Deng’s decision to consider reforms in 1975 and his 
role in launching reforms targeted at encouraging joint ventures and other forms of 
FDI in 1979.    
Scholars have noted the influence of the economic success of China’s near 
neighbors—specifically, Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong—
on China’s decision to open to deeper economic and technical cooperation with 
foreign companies.18  However, these scholars have not explored the possible 
influence on China’s Open Door policy of the highly successful and visible 
technology transfer to these countries and city-states that resulted from American 
joint ventures and FDI.  
Historian Barry Naughton acknowledged that China sought an alliance with 
the United States because of the Sino-Soviet conflict.  He also acknowledged that 
China’s reforms were influenced by the rapid growth of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore.  He noted that Deng Xiaoping was aware that great technological changes 
had occurred while China was isolated and that China had fallen behind the 
developed world.  Most importantly, he confirmed that China turned toward the U.S. 
in 1977-1978 just before the Chinese economic reforms were launched.  However, 
Naughton did not explore the role that American technology transfer played in the 
strengthening of the Soviet Bloc and in the expansion of the economies of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore.  Finally, Naughton did not suggest that China likely 
                                                
18 Yasheng Huang, FDI in China: An Asian Perspective; Margaret Pearson, Joint 
Ventures in the People’s Republic of China. 
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launched its reforms in 1979 in large measure to attract American advanced 
technology to China, as I argue.19 
I believe it is valuable to consider why China chose to institute reforms.  Why 
did China choose to reform its economic policies?  The disastrous 1958-1960 Great 
Leap Forward resulted in a vast, unprecedented famine in China and proved that 
China lacked adequate agricultural technology to feed its own population.  It was not 
by random chance that the first major trade by China with the U.S. after President 
Richard Nixon's trip to China in February 1972 was the purchase of a large quantity 
of American grain.  China's break with the Soviet Union and the subsequent 
antagonism between these two countries left China without its most utilized source of 
technology.  Soviet technologists left China in 1960.  China and the Soviet Union 
became bitter enemies, and the Soviet Union presented a serious military threat to 
China because of the U.S.S.R.’s superior military technology.  The disastrous 1966-
1976 Cultural Revolution then moved China backwards by decades in its domestic 
science and technology capability by purging (and killing some) top scientists and 
technologists and destroying the quality of China’s technical and engineering schools. 
 Very little domestic technological progress occurred during the Cultural Revolution 
between 1966 and 1976.  Mao Zedong’s death on September 9, 1976 presented an 
opportunity for new leadership to utilize a different approach to face China’s urgent 
challenges of technological modernization, economic development, and geopolitical 
security.  Reporting just one month later on October 15 on the appointment of Hua 
Guofeng as Mao’s successor and the arrest of the radical leftist “Gang of Four” 
                                                
19 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 62-63. 
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leaders, Business Asia noted that some “China watchers” anticipated that China’s new 
direction would “be decidedly more conciliatory toward the West in general and the 
US in particular.”20  China was left with more than two decades of lost productivity as 
it approached the end of the 1970s.  On May 24, 1977, Deng Xiaoping spoke of the 
technological gap China faced, saying, “Now it appears that China is fully 20 years 
behind the developed countries in science, technology and education.”21  China's 
weak economy left it lacking in global influence and made it potentially vulnerable to 
much stronger potential Western "imperialists."  Its weak economy also made it 
potentially vulnerable to domestic unrest. 
It is clear from study of the primary and secondary literature that China’s 
economic policy reforms were launched to facilitate its technological modernization.  
China implemented its economic reforms primarily in order to close its technology 
gap with the developed countries in the world.  China urgently needed to access 
advanced technology from any of its trading partners in the late 1970s that could 
assist them with modernization in agriculture, industry, national defense, and science 
and technology, including the United States, Japan, France, West Germany, and other 
capitalist countries.   
But evidence suggests that China’s leaders recognized that American 
technology was superior and they realized that China needed American technology in 
order to modernize its technological capabilities.  Historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker 
argued that even though China maintained trade relations with allies of the United 
                                                
20 Business Asia, “China’s Pragmatists Appoint Chairman, Crack Down on Radicals,” 
VIII, no. 42 (October 15, 1976): 329. 
21 Deng, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping (1975-1982), 53. 
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States after 1950 before relations were established with the U.S., in the late 1960s 
“the United States remained the most desirable potential commercial partner and the 
source of the most advanced technology.”22  James Gao documented that scientists in 
China actively monitored the progress of Western science and technology in the early 
1970s through access to publications.23  The November 17, 1973, New York Times 
reported after the first U.S. trade delegation visit to China in 1973 that “the delegation 
took away a strong impression that the strongest interest of the Chinese was in areas 
of ‘high technology’ and quoted NCUSCT president Christopher H. Phillips as 
stating, “Implicitly they regard American technology as second to none in the world 
and they want to get into that market.  There’s no doubt about it.”24 
I argue that evidence suggests three factors tied to American actions in Asia 
likely influenced China’s reforms in 1979 that opened the country to joint ventures 
and other forms of foreign direct investment: the contributions of American joint 
ventures and other FDI to China’s economically successful neighbors in East Asia 
and the attractiveness to China’s reformers of enabling similar contributions in China; 
contributions of American joint ventures and other FDI to the Eastern European 
countries aligned with the Soviet Union, coupled with China’s competition with the 
Soviet Union for expanded economic relations with the United States; and 
                                                
22 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-
American Relations, 1945-1996 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 220. 
23 Gao, “Rediscovery of Western Science and Technology and Definition of Chinese 
Foreign Policy,” 38. 
24 Gale Cengage Learning, Photocopy, Administrative Files: Subject File, NCUSCT:-
Historical Files (1)-(6), 1970 and 1972, Records of the National Council for United 
States-China Trade 1973-1983 Collection, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, 
Archives Unbound (afterwards, “NCUSCT”), 
http://go.galegroup.com/gdsc/i.do?&id=GALE%7CSC5102058095&v=2.1&u=acd_g
dsc&it=r&p=GDSC&sw=w&viewtype=fullcitation (accessed October 21, 2012). 
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interactions between American leaders and businesspeople and their Chinese 
counterparts.  These three themes provide the structure of this thesis. 
Chapter 2: U.S. Activity in East Asia 
American companies led the rest of the world in the 1970s in investments and 
technology transfer to Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, and were gaining 
on Japan’s leadership position in South Korea.  These Asian “Tigers” used 
predominantly American but also Japanese and some European technology and 
investments to establish rapidly growing, export-oriented, manufacturing-based 
economies.  I argue that China needed and wanted to draw American companies into 
foreign investments and technology transfer in China in order to replicate this model.  
As I will repeat throughout this thesis, I argue that China’s economic reforms in 1979 
that opened China to joint ventures and other forms of foreign direct investment were 
made in order to attract all foreign suppliers of advanced technology to China, but 
were likely intended in particular to attract American technology to China. 
The U.S. government played a very active role in the reconstruction of the 
economies of Japan after World War II, of Taiwan following the Chinese civil war, 
and of South Korea after both WWII and the Korean War.  American advisors led the 
development of economic policy and the United States provided vast amounts of 
economic aid, especially to Taiwan and South Korea.25  The U.S. provided military 
security for Japan through the American armed forces, which enabled Japan to spend 
only a very low percentage of its annual budgets from 1945 through the 1970s on its 
                                                
25 Jung-en Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 45-58. 
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internal “self-defense force.”  The U.S. supplemented the armed forces of South 
Korea with a large resident contingent of American soldiers, similarly reducing the 
level of expenditure required by South Korea on its national military forces.  Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan were strategically important regions of American influence 
near the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union during the geopolitical 
tensions of the Cold War.  U.S. foreign policy sought to contain the spread of 
communism by maintaining the economic vitality of these three countries.  As 
professor and specialist on Korean economic growth Stephen Haggard explained: 
 
Japan’s defeat in the Second World War made the United States the pre-
eminent power in the region.  The outbreak of conflict on the Korean 
peninsula extended the Cold War to Asia, altering the United States’ strategic 
perception of the region and creating expanded political and economic 
commitments to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan.  The growth of a regional 
economy in the Pacific Basin cannot be understood without reference to this 
underlying strategic context.  As with the Marshall Plan in Europe, the 
extension of aid and the encouragement of regional economic interdependence 
served three interlocking purposes: economic reconstruction; buttressing the 
position of pro-American political elites; and cementing strategic relations 
with economic ties…import substitution in the fifties was financed largely by 
American aid.  American advisors played a role in the shift toward export-led 
growth as well.26    
 
 
While American aid itself did not drive the growth subsequently experienced 
by South Korea and Taiwan, it did contribute to economic stability and enable 
investments in infrastructure that proved to be important later.  International 
economics professor James Riedel noted,  
 
                                                
26 Stephan Haggard, “The Politics of Industrialization in The Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan,” in Achieving Industrialization in East Asia, ed. Helen Hughes (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988): 265. 
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Much attention has been given to the fact that two of the most successful East 
Asian countries, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, received disproportionate 
amounts of foreign aid prior to rapid growth…The purpose of United States 
aid to Taiwan and the Republic of Korea was mainly to help absorb the 
burden of their confrontation with neighboring communist states.  It did, none 
the less, allow investment, mainly in infrastructure, that would not otherwise 
have been possible given their extraordinary defense obligations…The main 
contribution of aid in Taiwan and the Republic of Korea seems to have been 
political and economic stability rather than growth per se.27 
 
 
American aid to South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan did not influence China’s 
Open Door reforms.  But active American government and private company 
involvement in the rebuilding of the economies of these countries following their 
wartime devastation laid a foundation that later supported export orientation and 
supported the interests of American companies in industrialization and technology 
cooperation in these countries.  I argue that the subsequent technology transfer by 
American companies to these East Asian countries did, in fact, influence China’s 
Open Door reforms.  
Even though the U.S. prohibited trade with China during the 1950s and 1960s, 
U.S. companies established strategic business relationships and traded in East Asian 
countries near China.  American companies developed joint ventures for trade and 
technology transfer and made investments in firms in Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s.28 
                                                
27 James Riedel, “Economic Development in East Asia: Doing What Comes 
Naturally?” in Achieving Industrialization in East Asia,” ed. Helen Hughes (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 24-25. 
28 Carroll Kilpatrick, “U.S. Ends Ban on China Trade; Items Are Listed,” New York 
Times, June 11, 1971; New York Times, July 20, 1976; “Japan Pulls Back on Fiber 
Investments,” International, Chemical Week, August 18, 1976; “Success in the Drug 
Business Runs in the Family,” People, Chemical Week, October 6, 1976, 46; “South 
Korea Battles Fertilizer Glut,” International, Chemical Week, April 13, 1977, 26. 
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Even though China and the United States restricted travel between the two 
countries and didn’t maintain diplomatic relations, China’s leaders were kept well 
informed about U.S. activities in the world.  President Gerald Ford noted in his 
memoirs that during his visit to China in June 1972, Premier Zhou Enlai spoke about 
“efforts to solve the pollution problem in New Orleans; he knew the dates of the 
forthcoming Republican and Democratic conventions and he even suggested to us 
that we go back and read a speech that Nixon had given in Kansas City a year 
before.”29  The Xinhua News Agency prepared an information journal containing 
foreign news reports and other information for Chinese leaders that was published 
several times a day.30  In an important article in Foreign Affairs in 1967, which was 
an important early signal to the Chinese that he was prepared to begin steps toward 
rapprochement, President Richard Nixon noted that superior “Western technology 
and Western organization” were contributing to the modernization of East Asia, and 
he highlighted the strong economic growth achieved by Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Korea, Singapore and Malaysia.31  Professor Chen Jian reported that Mao 
read this article when it was included in the daily summary of news compiled by the 
Xinhua News Agency.32 
The Xinhua News Agency maintained an important Hong Kong branch.  
According to Professor Cindy Yik-yi Chu, the Hong Kong branch of the Xinhua 
                                                
29 Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1979), 97-98.  See also Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 554. 
30 Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001), 362, fn25. 
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News Agency, or HK Xinhua, operated both as a newsgathering and dissemination 
institution and as a cover for the Chinese Communist Party’s covert political activities 
in Hong Kong.  According to Chu, HK Xinhua served as “China’s representative in 
the colony,” and some observers asserted that HK Xinhua reported directly to the 
PRC State Council’s Foreign Affairs Office.  Chu argued that HK Xinhua grew in 
size and influence during the 1960s “when Hong Kong’s importance as a base from 
which China could conduct indirect diplomatic activities with foreign consulates 
became clear.”33  HK Xinhua was well positioned to watch and report on the direct 
investment and technology transfer activities of American firms in the East Asian 
region.  
My research regarding the participation of American advanced technology 
companies in joint ventures, technology transfer, and direct investments in these East 
Asian countries draws heavily from the Business Asia trade journal, which was a 
weekly publication targeted at “managers of Asia/Pacific operations.”  Business 
International Asia/Pacific Ltd.’s regional headquarters was in Hong Kong, and the 
company published Business Asia in Hong Kong.34  Given the deep awareness that 
Chinese leaders demonstrated of world news and global events, and given the 
important role that Hong Kong served as a portal for information about the West to 
China, I argue that it is highly likely that Chinese leaders and planners monitored 
Business Asia as a source of information.  I assert that the data and news that I pulled 
from this publication and include herein were quite likely read by China’s influential 
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decision-makers directly, contemporaneously, from this publication during the critical 
decade of the 1970s leading up to the Chinese economic reforms in 1978 and 1979.    
Japan 
American assistance, trade, and technology enabled Japan to rise from its 
destruction during World War II to become one of the strongest economies in the 
world.  The U.S. occupied Japan from the end of World War II in 1945 until 1952 and 
was deeply involved in its political and economic recovery from the destruction 
caused by the war. 
The United States enforced a policy of punishment toward Japan during the 
first two years of the Occupation.  Direct economic aid from the U.S. was relatively 
low between 1945 and 1947, totaling just $108 million USD between 1945 and 1946 
and $294 million between 1946 and 1947.35  But as global tensions increased between 
the United States and the Soviet Union at the outset of the Cold War, George 
Kennan’s National Security Council memorandum NSC 13/2 redirected U.S. policy 
toward Japan. Kennan’s policy memorandum, which President Truman signed in late 
1948, encouraged the revitalization of Japan’s industrial capabilities with American 
assistance.  As Professor Richard Samuels noted, “The Occupation calculated that an 
economically viable and grateful Japan was more likely than an impoverished one to 
support the larger objectives of U.S. foreign policy.”36  Detroit banker Joseph Dodge 
arrived in Japan in December 1948 to lead efforts to stabilize Japan’s economy.  The 
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legacy of the “Dodge Line” included an intense focus on exports, the creation of the 
powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the strengthening 
of the Ministry of Finance.  According to Leon Hollerman, an economist who served 
in Japan during the American Occupation, the Occupation authorities presided “over 
the institutionalization of the most restrictive foreign trade and foreign exchange 
control system ever devised by a major free nation.”37  Decades later, after its Open 
Door reforms, China’s foreign trade and foreign exchange control system was 
similarly highly restrictive, perhaps drawing from the Japanese bureaucratic model 
developed during the American Occupation. 
Japan’s economy turned the corner toward growth when the U.S. directed 
Japan’s idle post-war industrial capacity toward the provision of war supplies after 
the outbreak of the Korean War.38  According to Korean scholar Jung-en Woo, “The 
Korean War was a deus ex machine for Japan’s economic take-off.  As Chalmers 
Johnson notes, it was the equivalent for Japan of the Marshall Plan, the United States 
having spent close to $3 billion in Japan for war and war-related supplies between 
June 1950 and 1954: ‘a gift of the gods,’ according to [Japanese prime minister] 
Yoshida Shigeru.”39 
After the U.S. occupation of Japan ended in 1952, American firms continued 
to assist Japan’s economic development.  Historian Kenneth B. Pyle argued, “In order 
to strengthen its allies in the Cold War, the United States was willing to subordinate 
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its short-term economic interests.  It thus provided U.S. markets, technology, and aid 
to them, singling out Japan for special treatment.”40   
American firms began manufacturing products in Japan in the 1950s, even 
though foreign direct investment was not encouraged at that time.  National Cash 
Register (NCR) was one of the first American companies to establish a foreign 
manufacturing operation in Japan.  NCR started manufacturing in Japan in 1957.41  
Other American companies that set up operations in Japan in the 1950s included 
IBM, Esso (Exxon), and Mobil.42  Japan obtained technology licenses from American 
companies during the 1950s, including a license from Du Pont for making 
polyethylene and one from Sohio for making acrylonitrile.43    
To jointly develop markets and to share technology, American companies 
began entering into joint ventures with Japanese companies in the 1960s as 
restrictions regarding FDI were gradually liberalized.44  Business Asia reported the 
results of a survey performed by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) in 1976 that explored why foreign and Japanese firms chose to 
participate in joint ventures in Japan.  The survey results revealed that foreign 
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partners generally wanted to gain access to the rapidly growing Japanese market 
through joint ventures.  But the survey showed that gaining access to the foreign 
partner’s superior technology was the most important Japanese motivation for 
entering into joint ventures: 
 
Some 61% of respondents indicated that the foreign investor enabled them to 
advance into new fields through the introduction of technology, and 47% gave 
this as the major reason.  Also, 34% mentioned (and 14% gave it as a main 
reason) that the introduction of foreign technology enabled them to raise their 
technical level—i.e. the joint venture decision was prompted because of the 
resulting access to better technology.45 
 
 
American advanced technology companies entered into joint ventures in Japan 
during the 1960s and the 1970s.  For example, Cummins entered into a license 
agreement and established a joint venture with Komatsu Manufacturing Co., Ltd. in 
1961.46 Delaware-based Hercules established a joint venture with Teijin in 1963 to 
manufacture dimethyl terephthalate, an important component in the manufacturing 
process for polyester fiber.47  A listing of twenty-one joint ventures in the March 31, 
1972 issue of Business Asia that were approved under a new Japanese approval 
methodology included twelve companies (57 percent) that were affiliated with 
American partners.48  By the end of the 1970s, the well-known American participants 
in advanced technology joint ventures in Japan included Burroughs Corporation, 
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Celanese, Cummins, Dow Chemical, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co., Eli Lilly and 
Co., General Electric Co., General Instrument Corporation, Ingersoll-Rand, Lithium 
Corp., Mercury Marine International Co., Monsanto Co., National Machinery, 
Pennwalt, Pfizer Corp., Sperry Univac, The Singer Co., and UMC Industries, Inc.49  
Joint ventures were established by General Motors with Isuzu, by Ford with Toyo 
Kogyo, and by Chrysler with Mitsubishi Motors.50  Other less well-known American 
companies also participated in joint ventures in Japan. 
Influenced by pressure from the U.S., Japan announced in 1973 a relaxation in 
its restrictions on the percentage of equity ownership that American and other foreign 
investors were allowed to hold in investments in Japan, allowing 100 percent equity 
ownership in more types of ventures than previously allowed.51   Business Asia 
provided a listing of “Some Recent Foreign Investments in Japan” in its May 10, 
1974 issue, and nineteen of the thirty ventures listed (63 percent) were affiliated with 
American parents.  These nineteen ventures included such advanced technology 
sectors as computers, automobiles and automobile parts, tractors, engine parts, marine 
generators, surface treatment materials and machinery, hydraulic pumps and motors, 
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pneumatic control valves, and office equipment.  American parents wholly owned six 
of these ventures.52   
The U.S. led the world in investments in Japan.  Although the percentage of 
the total number of foreign investments in Japan that were made by American 
investors dropped from 50 percent in 1972 to 45 percent in 1973, Business Asia stated 
that American companies had “always been the biggest group of investors” in 
Japan.53  Looking ahead at the end of 1977, Business Asia observed that “Japan 
attracts ever-increasing investment by US companies” and it forecast a 21 percent 
spending increase by American manufacturers during the following year.54 
Leading Japanese advanced technology companies were also linked to 
American firms through technology assistance agreements.  The Japanese firm 
Nippon Electric Co. (NEC) received technical assistance from Honeywell.  Toshiba 
received technical assistance from General Electric and was also affiliated through 
the Japanese firm Mitsui to Sperry Rand’s Univac division through a joint venture.55  
The U.S. also led the world in licensing technology to Japan.  As shown in the 
attached chart, 61.9 percent of all technology licenses in Japan were from American 
sources in 1962.  Though that percentage dropped to 52.7 percent in 1972, the U.S. 
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still held a greater than four-to-one advantage over the second leading supplier, West 
Germany.56  
Licensors of Technology to Japan 1962-1972 
 
1962 1967 1972 
U.S. 203 388 1,010 
West Germany 46 69 228 
U.K. 12 57 154 
France 8 29 150 
Switzerland 25 37 116 
Italy 5 11 50 
Sweden 6 2 43 
Netherlands 13 8 33 
Canada 2 10 24 
Austria 0 2 18 
Denmark 0 2 15 
Belgium 3 3 14 
Panama 3 11 9 
Australia 0 0 9 
Norway 0 1 8 
Others 2 8 35 
Total 328 638 1,916 
    (From Business Asia, “Selling Technology to Japan: What Industries Buy From Whom,” V, no. 10 
(March 8, 1974): 75) 
 
 In addition to being the leader in the total number of licenses sold to Japan, 
the U.S. also led in every industrial sector except one (textiles): 
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(From Business Asia, “Selling Technology to Japan: What Industries Buy From Whom,” V, no. 10 
(March 8, 1974): 75) 
 
Examples of technology that American firms licensed to Japanese firms in 
1973 and 1974 included offshore oil-prospecting equipment, assembly equipment, 
incinerators, aluminum can-making equipment, dust-collection equipment, fire 
proofing materials, magnetic punching dies, and plastic sheets.57  As shown in the 
following chart, the U.S. supplied most of the technological know-how to Japanese 
firms in 1974 and 1975: 
 
(From Business Asia, “”Technology Purchases By Japan Decrease For First Time in Years,” VI, no. 50 
(December 12, 1975): 400) 
 
Short-term technology transfer contracts covered either one-time transfers of 
knowhow or contractual terms of less than one year, while long-term contracts 
extended beyond one year.  Reporting in December 1975, Business Asia stated that 
                                                
57 Business Asia, “Some 1973 Licensing Deals With Japanese Firms,” V, no. 9 
(March 1, 1974): 66; Business Asia, “More 1973 Licensing Deals,” V, no. 10 (March 
8, 1974): 76. 
 26 
 
the U.S. “is particularly dominant in electronics and communications parts and 
electronic machinery, while Germany is mainly a source for machinery and chemical 
technology.”58  
American firms were more active in investments in Japan than in any other 
country or region in the world.  According to the Business Asia trade journal, U.S. 
Department of Commerce data showed that American direct investment in Japan 
grew 140.5 percent over the period 1966-1971, which was greater growth than 
American investment in any other global region.  The second highest rate of growth 
of American direct investment for this five-year period was in Australia at 92.6 
percent.59  The rate of growth of American direct investment in Japan increased to 
155.4 percent for the five-year period 1967-1972, which was again greater growth 
than American investment in any other global region.  This rate of growth 
significantly exceeded the second highest rate of growth during the same time period 
(Africa, 80.9 percent growth), reflecting the very high and continuing level of interest 
that Japan generated in American firms starting in the late 1960s.60  American direct 
investments in Japan increased further during the 1970s, and the pattern of the 
investments showed an emphasis on manufacturing in general and the manufacturing 
of machinery in particular: 
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(From: (i) Business Asia, “US Investment in Asia Shows Shifting Patterns And Manufacturing Surge”, 
IX, no. 43 (October 28, 1977): 340; (ii) Business Asia, “US Investment in Asia Shows Shifting Patterns 
And Overall Decline,” X, no. 46 (November 17, 1978): 366; (iii) Business Asia, “Important Reversal 
In US Investment In Asia/Pacific Region,” XI, no. 51 (December 21, 1979): 404) 
 
In conclusion, Japan’s post-war economy, including its export-oriented, 
manufacturing-based consumer electronics industry, was built on a foundation of 
American technology.  According to political scientist Richard J. Samuels: 
 
American firms have been the principal source of both military and 
commercial technology for Japan…American military transfers to Japan were 
dwarfed by the transfer of US commercial technology through the private sale 
of licenses and joint ventures…Between 1951 and 1984, according to one 
compilation, more than forty thousand separate contracts were signed by 
Japanese firms to acquire foreign technology…With nylon from DuPont, 
nuclear power from General Electric and Westinghouse, the transistor from 
Bell Laboratories, and the television tube from Corning, US technology 
licenses were “the technological basis for nearly all of Japan’s modern 
industries.”61   
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The U.S. was also deeply involved in the economic reconstruction of South 
Korea during its occupation of the country between 1945 and 1949 following the end 
of World War II.  Quoting from a British Foreign Office document, historian Bruce 
Cumings described the role the U.S. played in the Korean economy and its 
consciousness in 1950: 
 
American influence in the South had reached new heights by 1950.  The 
British minister Vyvyan Holt eloquently captured this a few weeks before the 
war broke out: …American influence ‘penetrates into every branch of 
administration and is fortified by an immense outpouring of money.’ 
Americans kept the government, the army, the economy, the railroads, the 
airports, the mines, and the factories going, supplying money, electricity, 
expertise, and psychological succor.  American gasoline fueled every motor 
vehicle in the country.  American cultural influence was ‘exceedingly strong,’ 
ranging from scholarships to study in the United States, to several strong 
missionary denominations, to ‘a score of traveling cinemas’ and theaters that 
played mostly American films, to the Voice of America, to big-league 




Cumings noted that South Korea was receiving more than $100 million a year 
in aid from the U.S. in 1950, and both the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration 
aid mission and the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group in Korea at this time were 
the largest contingents of their types in the world.63    
South Korea was economically devastated again after the Korean War ended 
in 1953.  And again, the U.S. assisted South Korea in its economic recovery.  
Professor of international economics James Riedel noted, “Indeed, in 1961, after 
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more than US$2 billion of economic assistance and US$1 billion of military 
assistance, it is reported that ‘USAID officials were wondering audibly whether South 
Korea was to remain indefinitely a pensioner of the United States.’”64  According to 
scholar Jung-en Woo, “From 1946 to 1976, the United States provided $12.6 billion 
in American economic and military aid to Korea,” including “$6 billion in U.S. 
economic grants and loans.”65  Woo pointed out, “The total cost to the United States 
of supporting Korea was really more like $1 billion a year: in 1956, for instance, 
economic aid was more than $326 million, military aid more than $400 million, and 
$300 million covered the costs for U.S. troops in Korea.”66 
Eager to stimulate economic growth, South Korea turned its focus to 
manufacturing exports for the international market in the 1960s.67  Favorable 
government policies stimulated growth in the level of foreign investments and South 
Korea became a manufacturing location for advanced technology products based on 
foreign technology.68  A report in 1971 in the Business Asia trade journal stated, “new 
foreign investment amounted to a record $86 million” in 1970, which was “double the 
previous record of $43 million in 1969.”  The journal went on to point out that “the 
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great increase in capital inflow in 1970 was due to the rapid expansion of US and 
Japanese investment, particularly in the electronics industry.”69   
The U.S. led in investments in South Korea in 1970.  American companies 
contributed 39 percent of the total in twenty-six ventures, while Japanese firms 
followed with 36 percent of the total in eighty-six ventures.70  Business Asia reported 
in 1973 that the U.S. was still the largest foreign investor in South Korea, and Japan 
was the second largest.  The cumulative investment (not including economic aid) 
from 1962 through 1972 in South Korea from the U.S. was $180 million, while Japan 
invested $149 million over the same ten-year period.  Considered together, the U.S. 
and Japan dominated foreign equity investments in South Korea. These investments 
by the U.S. and Japan represented 91 percent of the total cumulative foreign equity 
investment made in South Korea during this ten-year period.71  Japan surged ahead of 
the U.S. in direct investments in South Korea during the 1970s.  Japan invested 
almost four times the investment level of the U.S. in Hong Kong in 1978, and the 
U.S. trailed in third place behind West Germany.  For the period 1962-1978, Japan 
led by a wide margin with investments of USD $550.5 million, which was more than 
three times the $172.3 million level of the U.S. for this period.72 
The Korean government encouraged joint ventures between foreign 
companies and domestic firms instead of fully owned foreign subsidiaries, and most 
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joint ventures were established with the foreign partner holding less than 50 percent 
share in order to protect domestic manufacturers.  American advanced technology 
firms entered into joint ventures with South Korean partners during the 1960s and 
1970s, including Ford, Borg Warner, and General Motors in the automotive sector, 
and Dow Chemical, Union Carbide, and Mobil Oil in the petroleum and 
petrochemical sector.73  Many American companies received Korean government 
approval to own 50 percent in the joint ventures in which they participated, and 
American companies provided very important contributions to South Korea’s 
infrastructure and economy.  A fifty-fifty joint venture with Gulf Oil established 
South Korea’s first oil refinery, Korea Oil Corporation in 1963-1964.74  Honam Oil 
Refinery, a fifty-fifty joint venture between Caltex of the U.S. and Lucky Ltd. of 
South Korea created in 1967, was South Korea’s second largest corporation in 1974.  
Korea Continental Carbon, a joint venture created in 1968 between Lucky Ltd. and 
Continental Carbon of the U.S., was the sole domestic supplier of the critical 
industrial material “carbon black” in 1977.75  A fifty-fifty joint venture established in 
1969 between Dow Chemical and the Korean government was still the only 
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manufacturer in Korea of vinyl chloride monomer and polyethylene in 1975.76  A 
fifty-fifty joint venture established in 1969 between Union Oil of the U.S. and Korea 
Explosives Company built a power plant and an oil refinery, and that power plant 
provided “about one third of the electricity consumed in the Seoul-Inchon area.”  The 
oil refinery provided “about 15% of the country’s total refining capacity” in 1977.77  
A joint venture between Samsung Electronics and Corning Glass Works of the U.S. 
provided screens for televisions, which was an important segment for South Korean 
exports.78  A joint venture between Agrico Chemical Corporation of the U.S. and the 
Korea General Chemical Corporation to manufacture fertilizer was anticipated to be 
the “biggest chemical fertilizer plant in Asia” in the March 21, 1975 issue of Business 
Asia.79   
Business Asia announced in its April 9, 1976, issue that Amoco Chemical 
would be launching a new joint venture in the petrochemicals sector, and Magnavox 
Government and Industrial Electronics Co. and E-Systems, Inc. would be launching 
new joint ventures in the electronics sector.80  A new joint venture between Samsung 
Petrochemical, Amoco of the U.S., and Mitsui of Japan in the chemicals sector was 
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announced in 1977, as was one between Carnation of the U.S. and Samyang Steel 
Plate Manufacturing.81  
In addition, several leading U.S. firms were successful in establishing fully 
owned subsidiary operations instead of or in addition to joint ventures in South Korea 
during the 1960s and 1970s, including Fairchild, Dow Chemical, Control Data, 
Motorola, Signetics, and IBM.82  U.S. advanced technology companies Sperry Rand 
and Fairchild Semiconductors also made investments in South Korea, though it isn’t 
clear whether these were investments in joint ventures or fully owned subsidiaries.83 
South Korea also pursued foreign technology through technical assistance 
agreements, especially with Japan.  The U.S. led in the period 1962-1966 in the 
number of technical assistance agreements signed with South Korea with 48 percent 
of the total.  Japan emerged as the leading partner in technical assistance agreements 
beginning in 1967 with the U.S. following in second place.  In 1973, Japan was the 
technology supplier in 71 percent of the technical assistance agreements entered into 
in South Korea, and the U.S. followed with 26 percent.  Westinghouse, Allis-
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Chalmers, and Teledyne Vasco and other American companies entered into 
technology assistance agreements during this period.84 
Japan was the contracted supplier in 67 percent of the technology contracts 
executed by South Korean parties between 1962 and 1976, while the U.S. followed in 
second place with 21 percent.  However, the South Korean government announced a 
new five-year plan in 1977 that recognized South Korea’s “increasing competition 
from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan,” and aimed to shift South Korea’s focus to 
“heavy machinery, chemicals, and electronics.”  This plan encouraged “the import of 
foreign technology” especially from the U.S., the U.K., and West Germany.  The plan 
called for South Korea “to diversify its sources of technology, reducing dependence 
on Japan.” Business Asia observed that South Korea was “lagging behind its key 
competitors—Hong Kong and Taiwan—in the production” of electronic components, 
and it revealed that South Korean government officials complained that “the 
country’s heavy dependence on ‘second-hand’ electronics technology from Japan” 
was the major reason, prompting the turn toward the U.S. and Europe.85  Business 
Asia reported in March 1978 that the new plans launched by the South Korean 
government aimed to import about twice as many foreign technologies as had been 
imported during the previous sixteen years, and the journal reiterated that the 
government planned to “shift away from the traditional dependence on Japan for the 
bulk of its technical knowhow.”  It asserted “the US will become by far the largest 
supplier of new technology.”  The journal went on to state that 82 percent of the 
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recommended suppliers for the “technology items slated for inducement over the next 
two years” were from U.S. firms.86  
In summary, South Korea had a deep, complex economic relationship with the 
U.S. from the end of World War II through the 1970s, involving vast amounts of 
economic aid, military security support, and technology transfer from the U.S. 
through joint ventures and FDI.  Many of South Korea’s critical domestic industrial 
sectors were influenced by American technology acquired through joint ventures and 
American investments.  By 1978, Japan had significantly exceeded American 
expenditures in South Korea in direct investments (excluding economic aid) and in 
supplying technological assistance.  But the South Korean government announced 
plans starting in 1977 to turn away from Japan and strengthen its relationship with the 
U.S. for technological knowhow.  South Korea decided that the United States was 
their preferred supplier of advanced technology—and I argue that China came to the 





The U.S. supported the Nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek during 
the Chinese civil war between the National Party and the Chinese Communist Party.  
After the Nationalist army fled to Taiwan following their defeat in 1949, the U.S. 
began providing aid and military protection to Taiwan.  American businesses were 
deeply involved in Taiwan’s economy by 1950.  In his November 28, 1950, speech to 
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the U.N. Security Council, the People’s Republic of China’s delegate Wu Hsiu-
ch’uan claimed:  
 
Economically, the United States Government and American monopolies such 
as the Westinghouse Electric Company, the Reynolds Metal Company, the 
American Express Company and others have, through various devices, jointly 
dominated Taiwan’s main industries—electric power, aluminum, cement, 
fertilizer, and others—controlled the economic life of Taiwan, and actually 
reduced it to a colony of the United States.87 
 
 
Throughout the period of estrangement between the U.S. and China from 
1949-1970, Chinese government officials watched American activities in Taiwan 
very closely.  Mainland China (the People’s Republic of China) has long argued that 
Taiwan (the Republic of China) is a province of mainland China that must be 
reconciled someday with its parent homeland.   But, because the U.S. supported the 
Nationalists in the Chinese civil war, the U.S. maintained for many years after the 
Nationalist army fled to Taiwan that Taipei, Taiwan, was the capital of all of China, 
and mainland China would become reconciled to its Taipei-based parent government 
after the Chinese Communist Party was toppled.88  The tensions between the People’s 
Republic of China and the Republic of China eventually resulted in ramifications for 
international trade, which I will describe later.  
The United States provided massive amounts of economic aid to support the 
Nationalist government during the era of the Cold War. Historian Nancy Bernkopf 
Tucker observed,  
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From 1950 to 1965 the United States became intimately involved in 
Nationalist Chinese affairs …From 1950 to 1965 the United States provided 
an annual average of some $100 million to Taiwan in nonmilitary assistance.  
This amount exceeded the per capita contribution made to any other 
government in the world during the same period.  It comprised roughly 6.4% 
of total gross national product and approximately 34% of total gross 
investment in the economy.  In the especially important area of trade, U.S. 




According to scholar Jung-en Woo, the U.S. provided $5.6 billion in American 
economic and military aid to Taiwan between 1946 and 1976.90 
The state owned 80 percent of Taiwan’s industrial operations in 1953.91  The 
U.S. pressed Taiwan to open to foreign investment and to encourage private 
enterprise in the 1950s.  One remarkable success story that resulted from the U.S. 
involvement in Taiwan was that of Wang Yung-ching.  Wang, “a farmer’s son with 
only an elementary school education,” created Formosa Plastics Corporation in 1954 
using a loan provided through the American aid program.92  In 1972, Formosa 
Plastics was Taiwan’s “biggest and most profitable manufacturing conglomerate 
[and]…was one of the world’s largest plastics exporters.”93  
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Like other East Asian economies, Taiwan began emphasizing exports and 
changed its policies to encourage foreign investments in the 1960s.94  American 
companies made investments in Taiwan and provided advanced technology beginning 
in the 1960s.  For example, Mobil Chemical and Allied Chemical of the U.S. joined 
Taiwan’s Chinese Petroleum Corporation in 1962 to create a joint venture to 
manufacture fertilizer for the domestic market and for export.  This joint venture was 
then sold to the state-owned Taiwan Fertilizer Corporation in 1971, transferring with 
it the technology that the U.S. companies had provided.95  Philco-Ford established a 
fully owned subsidiary plant in Taiwan in 1965.96 
During the radical leftist Cultural Revolution, Zhou Enlai expressed China’s 
“Four Principles” in April 1970 to communicate a stand against foreign imperialism.  
These principles stipulated that China would suspend trade with any Japanese firm 
that “(1) invested in South Korea or Taiwan; (2) furnished technical assistance to 
South Korea or Taiwan; (3) supplied arms or other assistance to South Vietnam or 
Cambodia; or affiliated itself with a US company.”97  As a result, some Japanese 
firms discontinued business in Taiwan in order to placate China and thereby protect 
their business with the PRC.  Other Japanese firms stated publicly that they were 
“curbing their Taiwan activities” but then proceeded to do business in Taiwan 
through indirect means.  Business Asia reported this news under the heading, “Cold 
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feet only in Japan.”98  Japan then ended diplomatic relations with Taiwan on 
September 29, 1972, when it entered into the “Joint Communique of the Government 
of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” which recognized 
the PRC as “the sole legal government of China” and defined Taiwan as “an 
inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.”99  Business Asia 
reported in November 1972 that Taiwan’s business environment continued “to boom, 
with Japan’s choice of Peking over Taipei primarily resulting in Taiwan diverting 
trade away from Japan.”100  
The U.S. took steps in 1970 and subsequent years to improve trade relations 
between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China, which were strongly opposed 
by Taiwan, but Taiwan continued to encourage domestic investments by American 
companies.  Despite the shifting political relations between the U.S., the PRC, and 
Taiwan, American aid continued to flow into Taiwan and American companies 
continued to establish operations in Taiwan in the early 1970s.  For example, 
American firms American Cyanamid, Corning Glass, Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company, and USI Far East Corporation all announced expansion plans or new 
ventures in Taiwan in 1972.101 Ford Motor Co. announced a $54 million investment 
in an automobile plant in 1972.  Business Asia announced that this was “the single 
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largest private US investment in the island to date, and the year’s largest foreign 
manufacturing investment.”  The article noted that the government of Taiwan quickly 
approved the investment because it “was primarily interested in introducing new 
technological know-how from which the existing five car makers could benefit….”102  
The American firm Hercules announced a new polypropylene plant in 1973.103  
Business Asia reported in 1973 that U.S. Steel would replace Austrian supplier Voest 
Steel Corporation in a major venture with the Taiwan government to produce steel.104  
New investments by Union Carbide in petrochemicals, ITT in communications 
equipment, and Goodrich in synthetic rubber were announced in 1973.105 
A 1974 Business Asia article reported that “the US remained the most 
important trading partner” for Taiwan, absorbing 38 percent of Taiwan’s exports, and 
the Prime Minister was quoted as stating that Taiwan would “give US products 
preferential treatment for importation and encourage private firms to source in the 
US.”106   
Underscoring the influence that U.S.-based firms had in Taiwan, the 
government of Taiwan engaged an American management consultant firm to assess 
and report on new investment opportunities in Taiwan.  The consultant firm’s report 
in 1973 emphasized “Taiwan’s trend away from labor-intensive assembly operations 
toward more sophisticated and technologically advanced industries” as well as 
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opportunities to “support industries that supply major end-product manufacturers” in 
sectors such as automobiles, petrochemicals, and shipbuilding.107   
Demonstrating the importance of trade with Taiwan to the U.S., U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent announced in July 1973 that the U.S. would 
open a permanent trade center in Taiwan.  Only three other permanent trade centers 
existed for the Asian region at that time, located in Tokyo, Beirut, and a recently 
opened one in Singapore.  Business Asia reported that “an exhibition of industrial and 
scientific equipment” involving about fifteen American firms would accompany the 
opening of the new Taiwan trade center.108 
Taiwan’s retaliation against Japan’s decision to terminate diplomatic relations 
continued through the mid-1970s.  Business Asia reported in May 1973, “The 
government is encouraging imports from the US and discouraging imports from 
Japan.”109  This report was followed by another report in November that stated, 
“…Taiwan still promotes a buy-American policy, and imports from the US are up by 
about 65% this year, compared with last.  Total imports from the US, estimated to 
reach $1 billion this year, are likely to increase further.”  Acknowledging that Japan 
was still “an important supplier,” the report stated that “many heavy industries” were 
tending to “reduce their imports” from Japanese sources.110   
Japan’s withdrawal from Taiwan, and Taiwan’s corresponding efforts to back 
away from Japan’s technology, intensified in 1974.  A report in Business Asia in 
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January revealed, “Toyota withdrew from technical involvement in Taiwan’s 
automobile industry” in order to pursue sales of trucks and other products in the PRC, 
and Ford quickly filled that gap in Taiwan.  The report also stated: 
 
Japanese firms have been specifically excluded from bidding on major 
shipbuilding, electrification, and petrochemical projects in Taiwan…Japan 
Synthetic Rubber and Nippon Zeon recently lost a contract for a $16 million 
synthetic rubber plant to the Badger Co of the US.  Again, the Taiwan 
automobile firm, Yue Loong, is threatening to sever its licensing agreement 
with Nissan Motors and link up with General Motors of the US.  Meanwhile 
the Taiwan Government is promoting a Buy-American policy…111 
 
 
Taiwan’s “Buy-American” policy in the mid-1970s benefitted American 
firms, particularly in the area of major government projects.  Taiwan announced plan 
valued at over $5 billion USD in 1974 to upgrade its infrastructure and build major 
steel and petrochemical industries, and General Electric was chosen to support this 
plan by supplying locomotives and upgrading railroad tracks.112  USS Engineers and 
Consultants Inc., a subsidiary of US Steel, was selected to manage the construction of 
a large new steel mill and provide engineering services to it.113  U.S. firms Gatx 
Oswego Corporation, Consolidated Navigation, and Associated Maritime Industries 
participated in a joint venture with the Taiwan government to build a large shipyard 
that had three times the capacity of Taiwan’s existing shipyard and to build four 
445,000-ton supertankers.114   
                                                
111 Business Asia, “Problems of Trading With the Two Chinas,” V, no. 1 (January 4, 
1974): 7-8. 
112 Business Asia, “Large Development Projects Enhance Taiwan’s Economic 
Status,” V, no. 17 (April 26, 1974): 129.  
113 Business Asia, “Taiwan Investment Opportunities,” IV, no. 27 (July 6, 1973): 213. 
114 Business Asia, “Large Development Projects Enhance Taiwan’s Economic 
Status,” V, no. 17 (April 26, 1974): 130. 
 43 
 
American advanced technology companies also built plants in Taiwan for 
critical components or to produce vital gas or chemical products.  Union Carbide 
announced an investment in a new carbon electrode plant in 1974, invested in an 
industrial gas project in 1975, and announced their involvement in a joint venture in 
1976 that was associated with a very large ethylene glycol plant, for which they 
would be the main source of technology.  Business Asia reported that this plant was 
Union Carbide’s first manufacturing venture in Taiwan, even though they had been 
involved in investments and trading in Taiwan since 1967.115  B.F. Goodrich entered 
into a joint venture to build Taiwan’s first styrene-butadiene rubber plant, and OAK 
Industries invested in a plant to build laminates.116  National Distillers & Chemical 
Corporation of the U.S. entered into a joint venture with the government of Taiwan 
and a Belgian company to build a polyethylene plant.117  And Du Pont approached the 
government of Taiwan in 1975 for approval to enter into a technical cooperation 
agreement to provide new technology for making hydrogen to a Taiwanese firm.118 
 Despite Taiwan’s leaning toward the U.S., Japan continued to be a major 
supplier of technology to Taiwan.  Japanese firms led the rest of the world in 
technical cooperation agreements in Taiwan.  A summary of technical cooperation 
activity published by Business Asia in February 1975 showed that Japanese firms 
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were the contracted technology suppliers in almost 74 percent of the technical 
cooperation agreements executed by Taiwanese entities between 1952 and 1974.  
American firms accounted for about 18 percent of the total, and European firms were 
the suppliers in the rest.  It noted that seventy-six technical cooperation agreements 
were approved in 1974 alone.  Japanese partners were party to almost 57 percent of 
them, while American partners were party to about 32 percent.  The American share 
was almost twice the percentage from 1952-1974 but still far below the Japanese 
level.  This report stated that U.S. direct investments in Taiwan totaled $38.8 million 
in 1974, compared to $38.9 million by Japan, but it showed that the U.S. led the 
world in total investments (not including aid) in Taiwan during the period 1952-1974 
with 46 percent of the total.  Japan followed at almost 21 percent.119   
The trend in direct investments turned in favor of the U.S. in 1975, and Japan 
fell behind.  In 1975 the U.S. was the leader in investments in Taiwan, with 42 
percent of the eleven-month total reported in January 1976.  Business Asia reported 
that “overseas Chinese investors” followed in second place at 29 percent, and Japan 
followed in third place at 24 percent.120  
The issue of possible U.S. diplomatic recognition of China and the 
ramifications for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship started to appear in articles in Business 
Asia in 1977.121  However, unlike Japan’s experience, China took a much more 
pragmatic and conciliatory approach to the U.S.  In 1977, a senior Chinese official 
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stated that China was not concerned about U.S. companies continuing to engage in 
business in Taiwan after the normalization of relations between China and the U.S.122  
Acknowledging the continuing importance of American technology, Taiwan 
announced that a forty-three-person mission would travel to the United States in 1978 
to acquire $400 million worth of industrial products and farm equipment.  Business 
Asia reported that Taiwan Power was likely to be the biggest buyer and that it sought 
equipment for Taiwan’s four nuclear power plants.123 
The pattern of direct investments in Taiwan shifted again in the late 1970s.  
Overseas Chinese investors accounted for 43 percent of the new investments in 
Taiwan in 1978.  The U.S. was the largest non-Chinese investor at 32.7 percent of the 
new investments, and Japan followed at 23.6 percent.  The World Sourcing Sites in 
Asia guidebook, which was published in Hong Kong in 1979 by the publisher of the 
Business Asia journal, commented on Taiwan’s dependence on Japanese sources and 
its goal to shift away from Japanese suppliers: 
 
Due to Taiwan’s overdependence on Japan for industrial raw material as well 
as machinery and equipment supply, the government may, at times, favor US 
and European investors over the Japanese. In addition, Japanese companies 
have also used Taiwan as an assembly site for exports to circumvent barriers 
that the US and the EEC have imposed on Japanese exports.  This form of 
investment increases Taiwan’s total exports to these countries, resulting in 
higher trade barriers for the island’s products as a whole.  As a result, the 
government has recently discouraged investment from Japan in areas where 
Taiwan’s own industries have export potential.  In 1978, the Investment 
Commission ruled that new Japanese investment projects and expansion plans 
by existing Japanese manufacturers of color television set assemblies will no 
longer receive approval.  Furthermore, the government forbade local 
manufacturers to accept subcontracts from Japanese firms for assembling 
color television sets in Taiwan for export.  When Admiral Overseas Corp—a 
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former wholly owned subsidiary of Rockwell International of the US—was 
seeking a change of ownership, the government announced that it would not 
grant approval to the transfer if the new investor was a Japanese company or 
majority Japanese-owned local firm.124  
 
 
Historian Nancy Bernkopf Tucker observed, “Taiwan managed one of the 
highest sustained growth rates in the world through years of American aid and 
American investment.”125  American firms benefitted from Taiwan’s “Buy American” 
initiative in the 1970s following Japan’s decision to end diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan in favor of China.  The U.S. played an influential and very visible role in 
Taiwan’s economy in terms of economic aid, consultation and advice, trade, 
investments, and technology transfer from the end of World War II through the 
1970s.  Although Japanese firms continued to supply technology to Taiwan 
throughout the 1970s, American firms became the preferred sources, just as I argue 
they were China’s preferred sources as China formulated its new law to allow joint 
ventures and foreign direct investments in 1979.   
 
Hong Kong 
Of all of the East Asian “Tiger” economies, Hong Kong was the location in 
which the investment and technology transfer activities of American firms were most 
visible to the leaders of the People’s Republic of China.  Hong Kong played a key 
role in the global economy as the center of East Asian finance and trade facilitation 
before the Chinese Communist Party closed China to capitalism in 1949.  After 1949, 
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and particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, the leaders of China used Hong Kong as an 
important news gathering location and as a center for unofficial diplomatic contact 
with other countries.  Hong Kong served as China’s gateway to the East Asian region, 
both for two-way trade and for information.  For example, Zhou Enlai ordered the 
Xinhua News Agency to study the economy of Hong Kong as early as 1969.126  The 
dominant American role in building Hong Kong’s technology-driven, export-oriented 
economy was clearly visible to China’s leaders.  I argue that China’s reformers likely 
used the American role in Hong Kong as one of the models for China’s economic 
reforms in 1979. 
Although Hong Kong eventually returned to its historical role as a regional 
center for banking and shipping, it became a successful location for low-cost 
manufacturing during the 1960s.127  American and Japanese firms began 
manufacturing radios and semiconductor components there in the 1960s, and foreign 
and domestic firms began manufacturing consumer electronic products.128  Like the 
other successful East Asian “Tiger” economies, Hong Kong successfully pursued 
growth through exports of products that were based on foreign-supplied technology.  
Data published in the March 19, 1971, issue of Business Asia showed that the 
electronics sector provided 61 percent of the exports in 1969 that resulted from 
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foreign investments.129  By 1974, 65 percent of annual Hong Kong manufacturing 
output was exported.130  
American advanced technology companies established operations in Hong 
Kong in the 1960s and 1970s.  Some American companies were attracted by Hong 
Kong’s long-standing strengths as a regional finance and trade center and located 
their Asian headquarters there, including Dow Chemical (1966), Fairchild (1969), 
Goodyear Tire (1973), and Fisher Radio (1975).131  American technology firms also 
established manufacturing operations there, including Fairchild (1962), Outboard 
Marine (1973), Dow Chemical (1974), and Oak Electronics (1974).132  Other 
American companies entered Hong Kong through acquisitions or joint ventures.  For 
example, Amerex International acquired a manufacturer of electronic products in 
Hong Kong in 1972.133  A new joint venture between Intermagnetics Corporation of 
the U.S. and a Hong Kong firm to produce magnetic tapes was announced in 1976.134  
Hong Kong proactively sought to attract more American companies to the area in the 
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mid-1970s.  A report in the January 2, 1976 issue of Business Asia noted that “a 
recent investment promotion mission to the North American continent encountered 
considerable interest,” adding that “at least 29 US firms are making plans to set up 
operations in the colony.”135 
The U.S. dominated foreign investments in Hong Kong by a wide margin in 
the 1970s, and Japan followed in second or even third place.  Between 1970 and 
1975, the U.S. share of foreign investments in Hong Kong ranged between 41 percent 
(1972) and 49 percent (1970).  The electronics sector received most of the foreign 
investments.136  The U.S. was also associated with most of the foreign-affiliated 
manufacturing plants in Hong Kong.  American firms were associated with 
approximately 43 percent and 40 percent of the foreign plants established in Hong 
Kong in 1972 and 1973, respectively, while Japanese firms were affiliated with 
almost approximately 22 percent of the foreign plants in both 1973 and 1972.137  The 
U.S. share of the total foreign investment in Hong Kong grew between 1973 and 1975 
while Japan’s share dropped.  Business Asia reported in January 1976 that “the US 
continues as Hong Kong’s most important foreign investor (with 47.8% of the total), 
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followed by Japan (15.6%).”138  The journal repeated this theme near the end of the 
year when it stated, “The U.S. heads the list of investors with a total of HK$857 
million in 108 businesses [in 1975]. It is followed by Japan (HK$266 million in 77 
ventures)…”139 
The U.S. Department of Commerce announced changes in export regulations 
in 1972 that would make imports from the U.S. into Hong Kong easier.140  American 
advanced technology companies actively pursued trade with Hong Kong business 
partners.  Business Asia reported in May 1973 that twenty-five U.S. technology 
companies would exhibit their newest products at an exhibition in Hong Kong 
organized by the U.S. Department of Commerce.  The companies that were scheduled 
to participate included American Optical, Bausch & Lomb, Eastman Kodak, Fisher 
Scientific, Hewlett-Packard, 3-M, Monroe International, National Cash Register, 
Pitney Bowes, Rank Xerox, SCM, Systems Electronics, Tektronix, and Victor 
Intercontinental.141  A trade mission representing approximately fifty U.S. 
manufacturing firms visited Hong Kong in September 1978 to explore opportunities 
for “investments in the electronics and electrical components field.”142   
At the same time, the Hong Kong government actively sought technology 
transfer into the region.  A Business Asia report in August 1974 stated, “the 
government actively encourages the broadening of local industry’s narrow base.  
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Technology-intensive investments are particularly welcome, and joint ventures or 
licensing agreements that add new products to the colony’s manufacturing lines are 
likely to increase in the future.”143  Business Asia reported in May 1976 that a 
promotional tour from Hong Kong would visit the U.S. in midyear and pointed out 
that the government welcomed “capital- and technology-intensive industries.”144  
Hong Kong played a vital and financially lucrative role as an intermediate hub 
between China and its trading partners in the West and in East Asia.  Thus, Hong 
Kong served as China’s “window onto the world economy.”145  Business Asia 
reported in January 1977 that China had “just opened its largest Hong Kong 
department store, complete with computerized point-of-sale equipment, and mail-
order services covering the US, Europe, Japan, and Southeast Asia.”146  Hong Kong 
represented an opening to the West in other ways, too.  China asked the National 
Council for U.S.-China Trade for their recommendations of American companies that 
were interested in joint ventures or cooperation agreements in Hong Kong or Macao.  
With this official sanction, Chinese businessmen began experimenting with joint 
ventures and other forms of cooperation agreements with foreign companies in Hong 
Kong and Macao in 1978, before Chinese law allowed joint ventures in China in 
1979.147  Business Asia reported in December 1978 that a “Hong Kong lawyer trained 
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in the UK and US” was advising China on changes to Chinese law that would allow 
foreign equity ownership in China-based companies, which presumably resulted in 
the joint venture law issued in China in July 1979.148   
After China passed a law in July 1979 allowing Chinese joint ventures with 
foreign firms, two special export zones were established in Kwangtung province, near 
Hong Kong.  Of the two, Shekou was only interested in attracting joint ventures that 
would be engaged in manufacturing activities for export, while Shumchun facilitated 
compensation trade whereby the suppliers of foreign technology were paid with 
products manufactured with that technology.149  
According to Hong Kong-based Business Asia, U.S. subsidiaries located in 
Hong Kong “often acted as China watchers for their parents,” gathering information 
and assessing opportunities.150  Hong Kong also served as a portal for China for 
watching the West.  China scholar Lawrence C. Reardon said the Xinhua News 
Agency was the “eyes and ears” of China in Hong Kong.151  China’s leaders closely 
monitored economic conditions in Hong Kong.  One must conclude that the activities, 
investments, and technology transfer activities of U.S. firms in Hong Kong were 
closely monitored, studied, and analyzed by China’s planners and decision-makers.  
Certainly Hong Kong also served as a gateway from which they could also similarly 
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I make reference throughout this thesis to China’s economic reforms that 
began in 1978.  Historian Ezra Vogel clarified exactly when the decisions were made 
in 1978 that resulted in the launching of China’s dramatic economic reforms.  
According to Vogel,  
 
In official Communist Party histories, the Third Plenum of the 11th Party 
Congress, December 18-22, [1978] is acknowledged as the meeting that 
launched Deng’s policies of ‘reform and opening.’ In fact, the plenum was 
merely a formal ratification of what had been resolved in the lively 
discussions at the Central Party Work Conference held from November 10 to 
December 15 [1978].152  
 
 
The outcome of this Central Party Work Conference dramatically changed 
China’s economy and the world economy.  But Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader 
almost universally credited with leading China’s reforms, was not in China when this 
Work Conference began.  He was actually in Singapore on November 13, 1978.153  
He returned to Beijing five days after the Work Conference started.154  Deng entered 
this extremely important conference with the image that he had just acquired of 
Singapore, and he spoke positively about certain attributes of Singapore’s economy in 
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his speech in the closing session of this Work Conference.155  I agree with other 
scholars who have argued that Deng and other senior Chinese leaders used Singapore 
and the other East Asian “Tiger” economies as models for their reforms, particularly 
the 1979 reforms that allowed joint ventures and foreign direct investment.  However, 
I argue that China’s leaders in 1979 likely wanted to specifically attract American 
firms with superior technology to transfer technology to China in order to accelerate 
China’s progress in technological modernization. 
Singapore’s economy in the 1960s was dependent on the exportation of oil 
and petroleum, but manufacturing activity in Singapore turned toward exports in the 
late 1960s.  Like the other regional “Tiger” economies, Singapore focused on 
manufacturing electrical and electronic products for export during the late 1960s and 
1970s.156  Success came quickly.  An August 1972 article titled “Singapore Develops 
Fast As major Electronics Center” in Business Asia reported that Singapore had 
become “a major center for the manufacture of sophisticated electronics 
components.”  The growth of this sector was rapid, and the technology concentration 
included the leading edge of advanced technology.  Singapore’s electronics industry’s 
output grew from $3 million in 1968 to $110 million in 1971, driven by American 
manufacturers.  Fifty-nine million dollars of the 1971 output was derived from 
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semiconductor manufacturing.  The semiconductor-manufacturing segment in 
particular experienced a 269 percent increase between 1969 and 1971.157 
Singapore welcomed foreign capital and technology, which fueled its rapid 
growth and economic success.  American technology companies established 
operations in Singapore beginning in the late 1960s.   For example, Cummins Diesel 
International Ltd., a subsidiary of Cummins Engine Company, moved its East Asian 
headquarters to Singapore from Hong Kong in 1967.158  National Semiconductors 
established its first plant in Asia in Singapore in 1968.  This plant was one of the first 
American electronics plants in Singapore.159  Fairchild established a semiconductor 
plant in Singapore in 1968.160  SCM Corporation established Singapore’s first 
typewriter manufacturing facility when it invested in a wholly owned venture to make 
Corona brand typewriters in 1973.161   
Large American tool making and engineering firms invested in Singapore in 
the early 1970s in both new and existing plants.162  For example, American 
manufacturer LeBlond announced an investment in Singapore in precision lathes in 
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1974.163  Business Asia reported in August 1973 that “while capital intensive, high-
technology industries will continue to expand due to official encouragement, 
investment commitments in low-technology industries will continue to diminish.”  
The report went on to note the prominence of American and Japanese firms amongst 
the new investors, and it highlighted three investments by American firms.  Air 
Filters and Johns-Manville had made investments in filtration products, and 
Cincinnati Milacron had made an investment in plastic molding equipment.164  
Business Asia reported in October 1977 that Singapore’s Economic Development 
Board had “recently marked out certain industries to which US investment is 
particularly to be wooed.  These include aircraft manufacturing and related industries, 
communications equipment, specialty chemicals, consumer and industrial electronics 
products, and medical equipment.”165 
Japan was the leader in total foreign investments in Singapore in 1972 with 
investments that included non-manufacturing activities such as banking and finance. 
Japan was also Singapore’s leading partner in trade in 1974, ahead of Malaysia and 
the U.S.166  But the U.S. led Japan by a wide margin in the early 1970s in investments 
in the manufacturing sector, with 37.3 percent share in 1973 compared to Japan’s 6 
percent share.  The American share in manufacturing investments dropped to 32.9 
percent in 1976 while Japan’s share increased to approximately 14 percent, reflecting 
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a decline in American manufacturing investments in Singapore, yet the American 
share remained more than double that of the Japanese.  The U.S. also moved ahead of 
the Japanese in trade.  Business Asia reported in October 1977 that the U.S. was 
“Singapore’s main source of investment capital” as well as “Singapore’s top trading 
partner.”167 
American companies dominated the electronics-manufacturing sector in 
Singapore.  Of the twenty-three companies identified by Business Asia in August 
1972 as “Singapore’s Electronics Manufacturers,” sixteen of them (70 percent) were 
American firms.  An accompanying article explained that this list showed the 
“electronics firms already operating in Singapore,” suggesting that the listing was all-
inclusive of current manufacturers.  This list included these well-known American 
advanced technology firms:  Fairchild Semiconductor, General Electric, Hewlett-
Packard, Litton Industries, National Semiconductor, Sperry Rand, Teledyne, Texas 
Instruments, and Union Carbide.168  
American companies actively pursued opportunities for sales as well as 
investments in Singapore during the 1970s, and the U.S. government recognized 
Singapore’s importance.  Trade between Singapore and the U.S. boomed, increasing 
by 28.3 percent between 1971 and 1972.  Business Asia reported in April 1973 that 
Singapore was then hosting “the largest US Government-sponsored commercial 
exhibition ever held in Southeast Asia,” at which seventy American manufacturers 
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were displaying scientific, business, construction, logging, and sawmill equipment.169  
Underscoring Singapore’s importance to American trade, Business Asia announced in 
April 1973 that the U.S. Department of Commerce was establishing a permanent 
trade center in Singapore.  The journal pointed out “only two other permanent US 
trade centers exist in Asia—in Tokyo and Beirut.”170  This trade center opened in July 
with an exhibition supported by twenty American companies affiliated with marine 
technology and shipboard products.  The exhibition showcased electronic navigation, 
communications, and instrumentation.171 
During a period in the early 1990s when China’s economic reforms stalled, 
Deng Xiaoping publicly revealed his respect for Singapore’s development.  
According to journalist Nicholas Kristof in an article in the August 9, 1992 issue of 
The New York Times, Deng challenged Guangdong Province, which borders Hong 
Kong, to “catch up with the ‘four dragons’ [Singapore, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
South Korea] over the next two decades, ‘not only catching up with them in terms of 
economic prosperity but also in terms of social order and public conduct.’”  
According to Kristof, Deng “also called for China to build ‘several Hong Kongs’ 
along its coast.”  Kristof quoted Shanghai’s Communist Party leader as saying “that 
China aimed to learn from the policies of South Korea and Singapore in developing 
their economies.”172  
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The impact on the global distribution of manufacturing supported by the 
transfer of technology and manufacturing from the U.S. to the East Asian “Tiger” 
economies during the 1960s and 1970s was profound.  Between 1963 and 1976, the 
percentage of global manufacturing that was located in the U.S. fell from 40 percent 
to 35 percent, while the percentage of global manufacturing that was located in Japan, 
Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore grew from almost 6 percent to over 
10 percent173: 
 
(Data taken from William H. Branson, Herbert Giersch, and Peter G. Peterson, “Trends in United 
States International Trade and Investment since World War II,” in The American Economy in 
Transition, edited by Martin Feldstein (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 192) 
 
The Chinese government was very aware of American activities in the East 
Asian region.  As early as 1973, China operated large “retail Emporiums” in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, which allowed them first-hand insight into the economic 
growth models that were successfully implemented in those city-states.174  Japan, 
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South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and especially Hong Kong traded actively with 
China during the 1970s, providing channels for observation and deep interactions 
between parties on both sides. By the late 1970s, advanced communication systems 
linked China with the world.  In 1976, the first undersea cable between China and 
Japan was announced, which replaced satellite communications between the two 
countries, and a satellite connection was announced between China and Singapore.175  
Modern airports supporting China’s fleet of American and British airplanes linked 
China with the rest of the world.176  And most importantly, the Xinhua News Agency 
provided daily briefing reports on world news to China’s leaders.  Evidence suggests 
that HK Xinhua was an important source in Hong Kong for gathering news for 
China’s leaders about the rapidly growing “Tiger” economies. 
Without specifically identifying the U.S. as an influence for China’s reforms, 
one group of scholars and a retired CEO with significant experience in China noted 
that China studied the experiences of other developing countries, stating in 1991:  “In 
its turn to pragmatism the Chinese government has sought to learn lessons from the 
experience of other developing countries with foreign direct investment (FDI).  It 
commissioned a number of studies by U.N. organizations and examined the record of 
many other countries.”  This group went on to argue that China clearly observed the 
economic success of its East Asian neighbors and their welcoming of FDI:  
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China has been pressed from the east and south by models of successful 
economic development in Japan and the “four dragons”—Korea, Taiwan, and 
the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore.  Each of these has close cultural 
and historical ties to China, resulting in competitive as well as collaborative 
relations.  Despite the relative isolation of China, it has witnessed these 
successes and feels their competitive pressures as it opens into the world 
market.  The success of neighbors has been a significant encouragement to 
China’s opening. 
The success of Japan and the “four dragons” has involved modification of the 
traditional oriental governmental control over economic activity and a 
relaxation of centralized authority toward more open economies.  They have 
not fully adopted the Western model of development, but have relied on a 
stimulus to exports (rather than import substitution), on the free market and 
technology and private enterprise, and on FDI inflows.177 
   
 
 Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors under President Gerald Ford 
between 1974 and 1977, and later chairman of the Federal Reserve Board between 
1987 and 2006, Alan Greenspan was similarly specific about the influence of the East 
Asian “Tigers” on China’s economic reforms: 
 
Before China reinvented itself as East Asia’s eight-hundred pound economic 
gorilla, the nations nicknamed the “Asian Tigers” tested and perfected the 
economic model China has chosen to pursue.  China’s export-led explosion in 
economic growth has clearly followed the earlier path of these Tigers—
particularly Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore.  Their model is 
simple and effective.  The developing nation opens up part or all of its 
economy to foreign investment to employ a low-wage, but often educated, 
workforce.  Sometimes it’s politically easier to set up designated geographic 
areas such as China’s Special Economic Zones to welcome foreign investment 
and its technology.178 
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Professor David Shambaugh asserted that “Deng studied the East Asian 
development model carefully.”179  I argue that Deng, Hua, and other leaders of China 
likely also studied the role that American investments and technology played in these 
successful East Asian regional economies.  They understood that the course taken by 
these five countries was to import foreign technology and to utilize it as the basis for 
export-driven economic growth.  They recognized that this model would serve China 
well as a development model.  I argue that China’s leaders recognized that the 
“Tiger” economies were beneficiaries of American investments and technology, and 
their reforms in 1979 were likely directed at specifically attracting American 
investments and technology to China. 
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Chapter 3: U.S. Involvement in the Soviet Bloc 
Primary sources show that China’s reformers studied the experiences of the 
Eastern European allies of the Soviet Union, particularly Romania and Yugoslavia, 
and secondary sources report that the reformers considered those models as they 
formulated the reforms of 1978 and 1979.180  However, these reports do not 
acknowledge the importance of the technology transfer activities of American 
companies in these countries. 
For example, Mao’s immediate successor Hua Guofeng pointed to the 
experiences of Yugoslavia and Romania as learning opportunities for China after he 
visited those countries in August 1978, just prior to the Work Conference and Third 
Plenum in November and December that launched China’s economic reforms.  
According to Ezra Vogel, “Upon his return, Hua reported on what China could learn 
from Yugoslavia and Romania: those countries accepted foreign currency, had joint 
ventures with foreign countries, carried on compensation trade (countertrade in which 
investments are repaid from their profits), and brought in foreign technology—all 
without any loss of sovereignty.”181  The Chinese press was made aware of Hua’s 
observations, which I argue signaled that Chinese decision makers wanted the public 
and the West to know that the East European reform model was being considered as a 
model for reforms.  In October 1978 Business Asia reported, 
 
                                                
180 See Pearson, Joint Ventures in the People’s Republic of China, and Halpern, 
“Learning from Abroad: Chinese Views of the East European Economic Experience”; 
Business Asia, “New Breakthrough in Selling to China: Countertrade Comes of Age,” 
X, no. 40 (October 6, 1978): 316-317. 
181 Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, 189. 
 64 
 
Since Chairman Hua-Kuo-feng’s recent visit to Yugoslavia and Romania, the 
Peking press has been playing up the valuable East European experience 
China could adapt to its own conditions, especially in the field of foreign 
technology acquisition.  By 1967, more than 300 firms had concluded various 
forms of coproduction and cooperation agreements with Belgrade.  That year, 
a new law was drafted, allowing free transfer of capital and profits for foreign 
investors and opening the door to joint ventures.  If China follows a similar 
pattern, joint equity ventures may be only a few years off.182 
 
 
In addition, primary sources and the secondary literature widely report that 
China and the Soviet Union were enemies in the 1960s and 1970s, and China’s 
leaders including Mao and Deng thought that U.S. government efforts at détente 
failed to reflect the threat that they believed the Soviet Union posed to China and the 
world.  However, these do not acknowledge the importance of the technology transfer 
activities of American companies to the Soviet Union and its East European allies.  It 
is important, therefore, to examine the history of the transfer of advanced 
technologies by American companies to the Soviet Union and its East European allies 
during the 1960s and 1970s.  
The United States and the Soviet Union expanded trade relations in the 1950s, 
which opened the door to increased contact between the two countries.  As soon as 
the door opened, American companies rushed to develop trade opportunities with the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries aligned with it—East Germany, 
Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Albania, and Yugoslavia—
known together as the Soviet Bloc.  The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. then launched an era 
of détente beginning in the late 1960s that was intended to lessen tensions between 
these superpowers and reduce the risk of nuclear war.  American firms entered into 
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technology transfer relationships for their advanced technology within the Soviet 
Bloc, including licenses and joint ventures where they were allowed.  The economic 
and military strength of the Soviet Union and its allies increased as a result of the 
transfer of American technology.183   
However, China and the Soviet Union became enemies during the 1960s.  By 
the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union and China had troops massed at their shared 
border, and some limited skirmishes occurred.  Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and 
other leaders in China believed that war between China and the Soviet Union was 
inevitable.  I argue that China’s leaders saw American technology transfer to the 
Soviet Bloc as a serious strategic threat to the security of China and China’s joint 
venture law in 1979 was likely influenced by its need to draw American firms and 
their advanced technology to China to counter that threat. 
The Soviet Union accepted foreign capital and engaged in joint ventures with 
foreign companies during its earliest days under Vladimir Lenin.  According to 
Chinese trade official Zhang Peiji, “About two-thirds of the projects in the period of 
the First Five Year Plan were constructed by using capital and technology from the 
United States and Germany.”184  Josef Stalin terminated these cooperative linkages 
when relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union chilled at the beginning of the 
                                                
183 See the testimonies and evidence presented in the hearings held by the Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Transfer of 
United States High Technology to the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc Nations, 97th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 1982. 
184 Zhang Peiji, “China’s Strategy and Policy on Utilizing Foreign Capital,” in 
Richard D. Robinson, ed., Foreign Capital and Technology in China, 4.  Zhang was 
Director, International Trade Research Institute, China Ministry of Foreign Relations 
and Trade (MOFERT). 
 66 
 
Cold War, and the U.S. terminated the Soviet Union’s Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
trade status in the early 1950s. 
However, the U.S. continued active trade with the Soviet Bloc after 1950 but 
officially barred most trade with China until 1971.  Imports to the U.S. from the 
Soviet Bloc reached $62.6 million in 1958 compared to $0.2 million from China, and 
U.S. exports to the Soviet Bloc totaled $113.2 million while there were none to 
China.185  
China built a close alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950s when anti-
communist political forces in the U.S. rejected any prospects for trade and diplomatic 
relations after the 1949 Communist Revolution and the start of the Korean War.  The 
Soviet Union provided large-scale, fully built industrial plants to China, and Soviet 
technologists were placed in China to provide engineering and technical support.  
However, China’s relationship with the U.S.S.R. fractured starting in the mid-1950s, 
and the Soviet technologists were pulled out of China in 1960.186  China’s 
relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated even further in the 1960s as Moscow 
attempted to tightly control all of the socialist countries.  After the Soviets invaded 
Prague on August 21, 1968, China resumed previously stalled talks with the United 
States.  Soviet and Chinese military clashes along the Chinese-Soviet border in 
Mongolia in 1969 led to a buildup of armed forces and the positioning of nuclear 
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weapons for possible use.  The threat of full-scale war motivated China to repair its 
relationship with the U.S. in order to create an alliance against the Soviet Union.187  
However, the Chinese Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958 and the 1966-
1976 Cultural Revolution in China caused massive domestic instability, particularly 
among educated technologists and scientists, and stalled domestic technological 
development.  Mao distrusted intellectuals because he believed that most intellectuals 
were not Marxists.  According to John King Fairbank, Mao claimed that “all great 
intellectual achievements had been made by relatively uneducated youth” and 
“worship of technology was a fetish.”188  Mao launched a campaign against 
intellectuals in June 1957 called the “Anti-Rightist Campaign,” which lasted through 
1958.  Hundreds of thousands of skilled and educated Chinese intellectuals were 
purged from their work under suspicion of being too soft on capitalism and 
insufficiently revolutionary.  Less than a decade later, Mao launched the Great 
Proletariat Cultural Revolution in 1966 to purge the Chinese Communist Party and 
Chinese society of “capitalist roaders” by young, undisciplined Red Guard activists.  
Vast numbers of scientists, technologists, educators and intellectuals were stripped of 
their jobs by the Red Guard and sent to the countryside to perform rural manual labor 
or in many cases, publically humiliated, tortured, or even murdered.  Universities and 
technical schools were closed, and technology advancement came to a halt in China.  
The Red Guard took over the domestic foreign affairs offices as well and brought 
foreign relations with the U.S. and other Western countries to a halt.  Though the 
                                                
187 Roderick MacFarquhar, Sino-American Relations, 1949-71, 242; Kathlin Smith, 
“The Role of Scientists in Normalizing U.S.-China Relations,” 120.  
188 John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Cambridge, MA: 
Belknap Press), 364, 367. 
 68 
 
most violent part of the Cultural Revolution ended in 1969, the strong undercurrent of 
anti-intellectualism disrupted scientific and technological development until Mao’s 
death in 1976.189  Thus, while the rest of the world made great advances between the 
1950s and the 1970s in electronics, chemicals, communications, transportation, and 
other fields, China lost twenty important years in the development of its domestic 
science and technology capabilities.  A great gap developed between its domestic 
capabilities in agriculture, industry, strategic defense, and science and technology and 
the technologically advanced countries of the world, especially the U.S.  
As the antagonism between China and the U.S.S.R. intensified, Mao turned 
toward the U.S.  But by the time Mao Zedong turned his priority to strengthening 
China’s relationship with the U.S., science and technology cooperation and 
technology transfer through trade between the United States and the Soviet Bloc were 
both already quite advanced.  The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. had maintained biennial 
agreements on scientific and cultural exchanges since 1958.190  The U.S. experienced 
increased trade with the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1960s, both in terms of 
exports and imports: 
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(From CIA, “Détente and US-Soviet Trade,” 7 March 1972, 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000307809.pdf 
(accessed September 26, 2013)) 
 
The CIA reported that American exports to the U.S.S.R. were for goods that were 
“not normally available elsewhere in the quantity or quality that the US can furnish,” 
and that this trade reflected “the USSR’s need for Western technology and 
equipment.”191 
The decade of the 1970s was a period of greater cooperation between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union and a relaxation of Cold War tensions.  Known as détente, these 
efforts were first conceptualized by President-elect Richard Nixon and Henry 
Kissinger during the transition period following Nixon’s election in 1968, and were 
linked with Soviet interest in expanding trade opportunities from the start.  According 
to Nixon, “we decided to link progress in such areas of Soviet concern as strategic 
arms limitation and increased trade with progress in areas that were important to 
us…”192  Nixon signaled his new approach to his Cold War enemies in his first 
inauguration speech, stating that “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an 
era of negotiation.  Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of 
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communication will be open.”193 According to former President Gerald Ford, the 
deepening antagonism between China and the Soviet Union opened a path for the 
U.S. to strengthen ties with the U.S.S.R.  Ford observed that efforts directed at 
stronger ties with the Soviet Union were possible “only because the Soviet leaders 
were becoming concerned about developments within the People’s Republic of 
China,” where public speeches and propaganda underscored Mao’s and the other 
Chinese leaders’ distrust and resentment of the Soviets.194  Nixon played upon this 
concern to the fullest in order to maximize the advantage to the U.S. of a closer 
relationship with the Soviets.195 
American trade with the Soviet Union turned a corner in May 1971 when the 
U.S. loosened controls on the export of automobile manufacturing equipment, 
including machine tools.  The U.S.S.R. subsequently placed orders for almost $250 
million of machine tools, oil and gas pipeline equipment, mining equipment, 
electronics, and other products from the U.S.196 
In 1971, as Dr. Henry Kissinger met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai to 
prepare for an unprecedented visit to China by President Richard Nixon the following 
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year, Nixon was also in the process of preparing for a summit meeting in Moscow.197  
Nixon made his historic trip to China in February 1972, marking the first direct 
contact between the heads of the two states in twenty years, and then he visited 
Moscow in May.  That 1972 summit meeting between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
resulted in agreements that encouraged the expansion of trade and cooperation in 
science and technology.  According to a Congressional report, these agreements:  
 
represented a significant departure from other cooperative agreements 
between these two countries.  Most notably, they initiated agreements for joint 
research and development in a wide range of scientific and technological 
activities.  Some of the areas include cooperative research and development in 
atomic energy, science and technology including computer management and 
high-energy physics, space, and ocean studies.198 
 
 
The agreements that resulted from this summit meeting called for cooperative 
research and development in the fields of agriculture, atomic energy, energy, 
environmental protection, housing, medical science and public health, oceans, science 
and technology, space and transportation.  These agreements called for cooperative 
activities such as: 
• Exchange of scientists and specialists; 
• Exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation; 
• Joint development and implementation of programs and projects in the 
fields of basic and applied sciences; 
• Joint research, development, and testing and exchange of research results 
and experience between scientific research institutions and organizations; 
• Organization of joint courses, conferences and symposia; 
• Rendering of help, as appropriate, on both sides in establishing contacts 
and arrangements between United States firms and Soviet enterprises 
where a mutual interest develops; and 
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• Other forms of scientific and technical cooperation as may be mutually 
agreed.199 
 
Thus, just as the leader of the United States connected with the leader of 
China in the first high-level interaction after twenty years of very limited and 
restricted contact, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. further strengthened their already strong 
trade relationship and deepened their cooperation in the most advanced fields of 
science and technology.  
The U.S. was not the first Western country to enter into science and 
technology cooperation agreements with the U.S.S.R.  The Soviet Union entered into 
science and technology agreements with France and Italy in 1966, with the United 
Kingdom in 1968, with Sweden in 1970, and with Canada in 1971.  After entering 
into the agreements with the U.S. in 1972, the Soviet Union entered into science and 
technology cooperation agreements with Japan and West Germany in 1973.  The 
common goal of all of these agreements “was to complement and encourage 
commercial contacts” for the benefit of the Soviet Union.200   
But the U.S. had become the leader in the world in certain fields of technology 
by the end of the 1960s.  Professor Ronald E. Hoyt noted that “By the end of the 
1960s, the United States had gained a clearcut superiority [emphasis added] in space 
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technology, which included computer hardware and software, rocket guidance 
systems, space communications, and applied satellite technology.”201 
The CIA noted in 1972 that the Soviet Union considered American equipment 
in certain technology segments to be superior to the equipment available from the rest 
of the world: 
 
The bulk of Soviet imports would be in the machinery and equipment 
category.  The USSR has indicated a long list of expensive capital equipment 
it desires from the West—automotive manufacturing, deep well drilling, 
automatic oil transfer and storage, oil refining, rolling mill, off-the-road 
vehicles, computers, instruments, data transmission, and numerically 
controlled machine tools—and it considers the US equipment and technology 
for many of these categories superior to all others [emphasis added].202 
 
The CIA also pointed out that “The USSR can buy most industrial and 
agricultural products in other western countries, but some kinds of machinery, some 
licenses, and some agricultural products (feed grains and concentrates in the 
quantities desired) can be purchased only from the US [emphasis added].“203  A 1974 
CIA report noted that “The removal of export restrictions on this equipment has given 
the USSR specialized machinery and technology that was not available elsewhere 
[emphasis added] and that the USSR had sought for years.”204  This report provided 
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details on the specific superior American technologies that were sought by the 
U.S.S.R.: 
 
The machinery and equipment that the USSR has sought especially in the 
United States include truck-manufacturing equipment, computers, and certain 
other electronics equipment, as well as various types of oil and gas field 
equipment.  These are areas in which US technology excels. 
 
Other…purchases include gear-making machinery, automated transfer 
machinery, and computer-controlled conveyor systems, all of which, for 
reasons of durability, precision, or productivity, are technologically superior 
to systems in Western Europe. 
 
Also in the energy area, the United States clearly excels in cryogenic 
technology, which is necessary for the operation of superconducting magnets 
and transmission lines, and in the pollution control and heat transfer 
technology associated with conventional thermal powerplants.  And in all the 
cooperative areas, those aspects of the work involving sophisticated 
instrumentation and automated control represent a potential boon to the 
Soviets, again because of the clear lead that the United States has in these 
technologies. 
 
US companies are the preferred sources of automotive equipment, oil field 
equipment, both computer hardware and software, and civilian aircraft 
technology.  In other areas, such as oil field equipment for Arctic exploration, 
the United States is the only technology source in the eyes of the Soviets.205 
 
 
  Trade and technology cooperation between the United States and the Soviet 
Bloc were already strong when American trade with China just began to break free 
from forty years of embargo in the early 1970s.  Imports to the U.S. from China 
reached $4.9 million in 1971, with no exports that year from the U.S. to China, 
compared to $223.0 million in imports to the U.S. from the Soviet Bloc and $384.2 
                                                




million in exports from the U.S. to the Soviet Bloc.206  Exports from the U.S. to the 
Soviet Bloc rose to $987 million in 1972, more than doubling the level of 1971, as 
shown in the following chart:207 
 
(From Business Europe, “Eastern Europe at a Glance,” XIV, no. 5, JA-74 (February 1, 1974): 37) 
 
American technology transfer to the Soviet Bloc increased significantly 
during the 1970s.  American companies that possessed advanced technology actively 
pursued cooperation agreements in the Soviet Bloc and provided licenses to their 
technology.  The Soviet Bloc realized by the late 1960s that most of the technology 
that they wanted was the property of individual American companies, rather than the 
property of state enterprises as in socialist economies.208  Individual American 
companies were encouraged to enter into technological cooperation agreements with 
the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology.  While these were not 
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commercial contracts, they often led “to specific implementing contracts for 
commercial transfers of technology.”209  Failure to enter into such agreements if 
invited to do so by the Soviet government was understood to be a potential barrier to 
business opportunities in the Soviet Union.  In 1973, seventeen companies from 
across Western Europe and five American companies had entered into joint research 
and development agreements with the State Committee for Science and 
Technology.210  By 1974, twenty-three American companies were confirmed by the 
CIA to have had entered into such scientific and technical cooperation agreements: 
 American Can Company  High-speed can manufacturing 
Armco International   Ferrous metallurgy, offshore oil 
Arthur Anderson and Company Accounting, information systems 
BASF Wyandotte Corporation Various fields in chemistry 
Bechtel Corporation   Heavy industry, energy 
Brown and Root, Inc.   Various fields of science and technology 
Control Data Corporation  Advanced computer equipment 
 Dresser Industries,   Petroleum wells, oilfields products 
 American Petroleum Service Division 
 Food Machinery Corporation  Farm machinery, agro-industry, mining 
General Dynamics Corporation Telecommunications, computers, 
aircraft, ships and shipbuilding, 
navigation 
General Electric Power generation 
Hewlett-Packard Computers, electronic equipment 
International Telephone and  Telecommunications, components 
Telegraph (ITT) 
Joy Manufacturing Company Mining machinery 
Litton Industries Electronics, chemicals, machine building 
Monsanto Company Chemical industry, rubber 
Occidental Petroleum Oil & gas, agriculture, metallurgy 
Singer Company Computers, household appliances, cash 
registers, navigation equipment 
Stanford Research Institute International business opportunities 
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Kaiser Industries Alumina-aluminum, iron ore, metal 
products 
Lockheed Navigation systems, civil aircraft 
construction, air traffic control systems, 
oceanographic apparatus211   
  
By 1976, fifty-three American companies had entered into such agreements.  A 1977 
Congressional study observed, “It often appears that the ‘Americanists’ among the 
Soviet elite…tend to assume uncritically that if it is American it is best.”212  
Soviet Bloc nations also bought licenses to enable them to utilize specific 
American technologies.  In 1975-1976, Hungary bought licenses from eleven 
countries including the United States.  The technologies acquired in this manner from 
the U.S. gave Hungarian firms access to American technology in earth cultivators, 
computer information units, maize and corn production, shoe production, and 
concrete processing.213  The government of Hungary released a plan in late 1977 to 
double its purchases of licenses for Western technology from a volume of $25 million 
USD in 1977 to at least $50 million in 1978 “in order to speed up industrial 
modernization and restructuring.”214   
The World Trade Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science reported that 
Poland purchased 310 licenses at a cost of $500 million between 1971-1975, 
compared to 136 licenses between 1966-1970.  The report stated that Czechoslovakia 
purchased licenses for Western technology at a total cost of $320 million between 
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1968 and 1974.215  Czechoslovakia bought 41 licenses from Western firms in 1976, 
bringing their total to 300 various licenses from Western companies.  Included in this 
portfolio were licenses from American firms, including Air Products for benzene, 
Allied Chemical for nylon, and Amtel for ethylene oxide.216   
The German Democratic Republic took a different approach to attracting 
American trade and technology.  The GDR launched a week of “Economic and 
Technical Days” in May 1978, in New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago to increase 
trade with American firms.  Nine hundred American visitors attended from the 
industrial, banking, and scientific communities, including David Rockefeller from 
Chase Manhattan Bank, Zoltan Merszei of Dow Chemical, and other heads of 
American corporations.  U.S. Trade Minister Frank A. Weil also participated.  RCA 
and Philipp Brothers were reported to have “agreed in principle to participate in 
large-scale GDR projects” as a result of their interaction in this exhibition.217   
The breadth and depth of the trade in technology that developed in the 1970s 
between the U.S. and the Soviet Bloc was illustrated by a listing of the “U.S. 
Government Trade Specialists for EE” [eastern Europe] in the December 23, 1977, 
issue of the trade journal Business Eastern Europe.  A staff of twenty-two economists 
and “business counselors” in the Department of Commerce provided coverage for the 
Soviet Bloc. “Area Specialists” were assigned to the countries of Albania/Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.  
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Six area specialists were assigned to the USSR alone, with individuals assigned 
responsibility for five different groups of trade issues:  “Shipping, aviation, tourism, 
technology transfer,” “Agriculture, mineral resources,” “Bilateral relations, business 
facilitation,” “Energy, industries, economic plans, foreign trade,” and “Finance, 
Comecon: compensation arrangements, customs and tariffs.”218  Five technology 
sectors were identified for Eastern Europe with a “Trade Development Assistance 
Officer” assigned to each one: 
 
Capital equipment, machine tools, food processing and packaging, 
environmental protection 
 
Chemicals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, forest products, medical and 
laboratory equipment, textile equipment, refinery and chemical plant 
equipment 
 
Construction, mining, metallurgical, automotive, materials handling 
equipment 
 
Electronics, telecommunications, computers, aviation equipment 
 
Financing, technology transfer, contract clauses, trademarks, oil, gas, power219  
 
 
Signaling the presumed importance of trade relations to the success of détente, 
the U.S. government engaged in activities that promoted trade efforts by American 
companies in the Soviet Bloc.  The U.S. Department of Commerce actively assisted 
eight U.S. companies in the materials testing field in their efforts to find customers in 
Eastern Europe.  Technical seminars on the companies’ products met with interest in 
Budapest and Warsaw, and especially in Prague where almost 200 people attended 
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the first day of the presentations, including Czech government representatives.  
Orders totaling $1.5 million USD for applications in Czech automobile and truck 
plants resulted for two of the eight U.S. firms.220      
Further evidence of the high degree of interest of the U.S. in the late 1970s in 
sharing technology with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies was shown 
by the schedule of upcoming U.S. trade promotions in Eastern Europe published by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce in mid-1979.  Advanced technology seminars in 
the fields of electric power, chemical processing, micrographics, and test and 
measurement equipment were scheduled for Sofia, Prague, Berlin, Bucharest, and 
Moscow:221     
 
(From Business Eastern Europe, “US Trade Promotions at Upcoming EE Exhibitions and Seminars,” 
8, no. 16, (April 20, 1979): 124) 
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Though the Soviet Union acquired American technology through technology 
cooperation agreements, direct trade, and clandestinely through its East European 
allies, it did not allow joint ventures in the U.S.S.R. during the 1970s.  The dispersion 
and diffusion of American technology in the Soviet Union suffered as a result of its 
prohibitions on joint ventures. 
Yugoslavia legalized joint ventures in 1967.222  Romania legalized joint 
ventures with Western firms in 1971, and Hungary followed in 1972.223  As reported 
elsewhere in this thesis, China studied the experiences of these three countries as it 
prepared to launch its reforms regarding joint ventures in 1979.  Even though the 
U.S.S.R. suggested at different times that joint ventures would be permitted at some 
point, the Soviet Union did not allow joint ventures with U.S. and other Western 
firms during the 1970s.224  
The Soviet Union began expanding their use of “compensation agreements” in 
1973 whereby Western suppliers of equipment would be paid through the revenue 
generated by exports.  Alternatively, the Soviet Union paid suppliers of equipment 
with the actual goods produced on the equipment.  These agreements were not 
attractive to all suppliers because of concerns over the quality of the goods to be 
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made by the Soviet producers.225  The U.S.S.R. also established “cooperative 
ventures” in which U.S. companies provided “advanced equipment, technology, and 
know-how.”  For example, Occidental Petroleum entered into a 20-year, $8 billion 
project with the Soviet Union to manufacture fertilizers.226  According to Harvard 
Law Professor and expert in Soviet law, Harold J. Berman: 
 
With respect to the interdependence of the parties, the present typical form of 
close cooperation between the Soviet Union and a Western firm, the so-called 
industrial cooperation agreement (ICA), falls between the full joint venture on 
the one hand and the typical export-import contract on the other.  Soviet 
export-import contracts are generally specific, short-term agreements for the 
purchase and sale of goods.  ICAs appear in a variety of forms, including, for 
example, licensing and subcontracting contracts.  Generally, an ICA involves 
an exchange of capital and technology from the West for goods and services 
from the socialist partner; ICAs do not, however, provide for Western input to 
the Soviet management process.  In the joint venture, Western management 
skills are included in the package of Western contributions.227  
  
 
ICAs were not the most effective means for successfully transferring 
technology.  Scholars have pointed out that joint ventures are a superior form of 
investment for both Western technology providers and their partners because joint 
ventures facilitate close and prolonged interactions between the foreign technologists 
and the recipient clients and they establish a shared objective of successful utilization 
of the technology.228  The CIA noted that technology transfer and diffusion in the 
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Soviet Union was hampered by excessive secrecy on the part of Soviets regarding 
where and how equipment would be configured and used, incompatibility between 
different types of equipment in installations, and lack of expertise in the operation of 
imported equipment.229  All these problems could possibly have been lessened if the 
suppliers of the imported equipment had been permitted to establish joint ventures 
whereby they would provide set-up and operational knowledge on an on-going basis 
to the enterprise, problem-solving skills in the running and maintenance of the 
equipment, upgrades to the technology as they became available, and other elements 
of managerial expertise.   
Despite the limitations on joint ventures and other forms of FDI in the Soviet 
Union itself, the importation of Western technology played a significant role in the 
Soviet economy.  The Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin 
“stressed the critical role of Western technology in improved Soviet economic 
performance” in February 1976 before the meeting of the 25th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  Western technology particularly benefitted 
Soviet industrial production. U.S. exports to the U.S.S.R of machinery and equipment 
increased by over ten times during the five year period between 1970 and 1975, 
growing from under $50 million in 1970 to $547 million in 1975.230   
U.S. exports to the Soviet Bloc totaled almost $4.15 billion in 1978, more than 
quadrupling the level of 1972:231 
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Throughout the period of détente and afterwards, the U.S. government and 
intelligence services were concerned about the use of advanced American technology 
in Soviet military applications.232  The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral 
Export Controls (COCOM) restrictions on the exportation of certain technologies and 
many types of products were significantly relaxed to encourage trade, but certain 
“strategic” technologies remained restricted in order to prevent their use in Soviet 
military applications.  However, to evade the public scrutiny and political 
consequences of directly acquiring certain technologies from the U.S., the U.S.S.R. 
acquired technology from its Eastern European allies, to whom the transfer from the 
U.S. was less sensitive. For example, the CIA reported in early 1974 that “in the past 
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year at least two third-generation computers were directed from their intended end 
uses in two East European countries to unknown activities within the Soviet Union.”  
“Third generation” computers were particularly desirable to the Soviet Union because 
of their applicability to the modernization of both military and non-military 
applications.233  
Czechoslovakia entered into agreements with the Soviet Union in 1972, 1974, 
1975, and 1976 to share technology and scientific information.  Therefore, it must be 
assumed that any Western technology acquired by Czechoslovakia was shared with 
the Soviet Union.234  The CIA reported in 1974 that, although the U.S.S.R. had not 
sought to directly acquire politically-sensitive state-of-the-art semiconductor 
                                                
233 CIA, “Soviet Economic and Technological Benefits from Détente,” i, 2-3. 
234 Wilson Center, “Record of Discussion and Text of Coordination Plan on Operative 
Technology from the Summer of 1972 Through 1974, Reached by the Committee of 
State Security (KGB) of the USSR and the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior,” 
July 14, 1972, Document Summary, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International 
History Declassified, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113486 
(accessed September 20, 2013); Wilson Center, “Protocol on Exchange of Employees 
and Information in the Scientific, Technical and Security Fields for the Year 1974,” 
February 11, 1974, Document Summary, Wilson Center Digital Archive: 
International History Declassified, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113561 (accessed September 20, 
2013); Wilson Center, “Protocol on Steps to Increase Coordination Between the 
Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet Ministry of the Interior in 
1975,” January 22, 1975, Document Summary, Wilson Center Digital Archive: 
International History Declassified, 
http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113491 (accessed September 20, 
2013); Wilson Center, “Protocol on Cooperation Between the Interior Ministries of 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Soviet Union in 1976,” January 23, 
1976, Document Summary, Wilson Center Digital Archive: International History 
Declassified, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113505 (accessed 
September 21, 2013); Wilson Center, “Agreement Between the Czechoslovak and 
Soviet Ministries of the Interior on Cooperation From the Summer of 1976 until 
1980,” June 04, 1976, Document Summary, Wilson Center Digital Archive: 
International History Declassified, 




manufacturing technology from the U.S., “technical knowledge and finished devices 
could be furnished to the USSR from Poland and other East European countries under 
special agreements for mutual cooperation in semiconductor R&D.”  The CIA 
expressed its concern that “Polish acquisition of this technology would make it 
possible for the USSR to acquire this knowledge and could significantly enhance its 
production capabilities over the long term, particularly in areas of strategic 
concern.”235  “Strategic” in this context meant military. Similar technology-sharing 
agreements may have been executed between other Eastern European countries and 
the Soviet Union.   
Though it continued to lag behind the strategic technological capabilities of 
the United States, the military strength of the Soviet Union increased as a result of the 
transfer of American advanced technology during the 1970s.  The Soviet Union 
acquired American advanced technology through the direct, legitimate trade that was 
encouraged by détente, as well as through illicit means, including dual-use 
technologies that were useful for both industrial and consumer products as well as for 
military systems.  And as Georges Sokoloff confirmed in his very helpful study The 
Economy of Détente, even the imports of advanced technology products from the U.S. 
that had no direct military application served as “resource liberators” that freed Soviet 
domestic industrial capacity to be utilized for military purposes.236  Admiral Bobby R. 
Inman testified at a Senate hearing in May 1982 after the era of détente ended that of 
the “militarily useful, militarily related technology which the Soviets have acquired 
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from the West, about 70% of these acquisitions have been accomplished by the Soviet 
and East European intelligence services, using clandestine, technical, and overt 
collection operations.”237  Senator William Roth of Delaware summed up the 
concerns of many in the defense community when he stated, “There is no question 
that the Soviets have undertaken a massive, well-financed, expertly coordinated 
program to systematically acquire as much as [sic] our high technology as they can 
steal, purchase through middlemen or otherwise appropriate…to advance their 
numerous weapons systems and overall military capabilities.”238   
Because of the direct threat that advances in Soviet military capability posed 
to China during the 1970s, I argue that China saw the ongoing technology transfer 
from the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. as a threat.  I believe the Chinese reformers wanted to 
pull American technology to China through its joint venture law in 1979 in response 
to this threat. 
 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade versus U.S.-China Trade 
In order to attempt to understand the Chinese perspective regarding trade and 
technology transfer with the U.S. in the late 1970s, it is important to see how trade 
developed after China and the U.S. resumed trade relations in 1971.  In stark contrast 
to the strong U.S. trade and technology exchange relationship with the U.S.S.R., trade 
was virtually nonexistent in the early 1970s between the United States and China.  
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Though the U.S. reached out to China, American trade with China developed very 
slowly.  American firms were far more convinced that trade would boom during the 
coming decade with the Soviet Union than with China in the early 1970s.  For 
example, an article in early 1972 in the New York Times about a news conference held 
by Secretary of Commerce Maurice Stans underscored the advanced nature of U.S.-
U.S.S.R. trade compared to trade with China: 
 
Some expansion in trade may result from the President’s trip to Peking, but 
commerce between China and the United States is likely to develop ‘at a 
much slower rate’ than with the Soviet Union…“After all…we are already 
doing business with the Soviets—about $150 million each way last year—and 
the Soviets have indicated a desire to buy American.”239  
 
Senior Chinese officials were very aware of American business activities in 
the Soviet Union in the early 1970s.  For example, in a meeting in New York on July 
26, 1972, Henry Kissinger spoke to Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations 
Huang Hua about the interest by the Soviet Union in “a large-scale American 
investment in Siberia” for natural gas development, which Kissinger explained would 
be handled by “private companies.”  Kissinger offered, “The U.S. is prepared—I have 
said this before—to put the PRC on the exact same footing as the Soviet Union.  So 
anything we do for the Soviets, that opportunity remains for the PRC.”  The record of 
this meeting shows that Ambassador Huang chose to not respond to this 
opportunity.240  Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Casey 
referred to this same opportunity for two American companies to invest in a venture 
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to develop natural gas fields in Siberia in his remarks to the National Council for 
U.S.-China Trade (“NCUSCT”) in 1973 prior to the NCUSCT’s first trip to China.  
This is an example of how technology cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. 
was both ahead of such activities in China and visible to the American council that 
was trying to develop similar opportunities in China.241 
Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent addressed the NCUSCT in its 
inaugural executive conference on March 22, 1973.  The memorandum summarizing 
his remarks highlights the contrast in the status of trade in 1973 with these two 
countries, and confirms the visibility of U.S.-Soviet trade ties to the NCUSCT:  “Re 
opening up new markets exports to the USSR have tripled and imports doubled.  The 
$450 million surplus with the USSR is the largest we have with any country,” but, 
“With regard to China, initial trade won’t be easy, but the odds are good.”242 
Trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc was the primary focus of 
“East-West Trade” in the mid-1970s.  The National Association of Manufacturers 
(NAM) concentrated its international affairs activities on trade with the Soviet Union.  
NAM sponsored a major conference in February 1973 that included over 800 senior 
business leaders as well as Soviet and American government officials, and E. Douglas 
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Kenna, president of NAM, testified to Congress in July 1973 on NAM’s vision for 
greater economic and technical ties with the Soviet Union.243  U.S. News and World 
Report stated in December 1975 “the U.S. has an enormous web of direct business 
with Russia now, ranging from efforts to establish limitations on strategic arms to the 
sale of American grain to Moscow.  There is no such web in the Chinese-American 
relationship…” but “the Chinese are interested in obtaining American technology.”244  
In his address to the NAM’s International Trade Committee in February 1976, 
a representative of the U.S. Department of Commerce highlighted the year-over-year 
growth of trade with the Soviet Bloc, and mentioned Cuba, Vietnam and North 
Korea, but made no mention of China.245  U.S. imports from the Soviet Bloc countries 
totaled $866.8 million in 1976, compared to $201.9 million imported from China.  
The difference in exports was even greater.  1976 U.S. exports to the Soviet Bloc 
totaled $3,494.5 million, compared to only $135.4 million exported to China.246    
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Because China and the Soviet Union were bitter enemies in the 1970s, China 
saw détente and the transfer of advanced technology from the U.S. to the Soviet 
Union as a major strategic threat to China’s security.  Efforts at détente between the 
U.S. and the Soviet Union were topics of heated discussion between China and the 
U.S. in the 1970s.  President Ford recalled that Zhou Enlai emphasized the Soviet 
threat when Ford visited China in 1972 and criticized talk in the U.S. of reducing the 
military budget.247  According to Ezra Vogel, Deng Xiaoping told Henry Kissinger in 
October 1975, “The Soviet Union has two weaknesses:  it needs grain and 
technology, and the United States is helping with both, helping resolve its weaknesses 
and thus increasing the risk of a Soviet attack.”248  Henry Kissinger reported that 
Deng asked how much technology the U.S. was transferring to the Soviet Union 
when he met with Deng in October 1975.249  During President Gerald Ford’s 
December 1975 visit to China, Deng referred to the Soviet Union as “the world’s 
‘most dangerous source of war,’” and said, “Rhetoric about détente cannot cover up 
the stark reality of the growing danger of war.”250  
China and the Soviet Union were bitter rivals in the 1970s.  China leaned 
toward the U.S. in order to build an alliance against its militarily superior enemy at its 
border.251  Despite active technology cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet 
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Bloc, the U.S. possessed technology that was superior to that of the Soviet Union, 
particularly strategic technology that was essential to military superiority.  A 1977 
Congressional study quoted an American scientist who reported, “The Soviet Union 
is far behind the United States in technology.  In space technology, in semiconductor 
devices, in precision machinery, in integrated circuitry and other electronics, 
computers in high technology which plays [sic] such an important part in modern 
warfare, we are far ahead of the Soviet Union.”252  Deng Xiaoping felt that attempts 
at détente by the U.S. were both naive and dangerous; the evidence suggests that he 
sensed that the U.S.S.R. was increasingly gaining a technological advantage through 
American technology that it could deploy against China.   
The evidence also suggests that China’s joint venture law in 1979 was influenced by 
China’s need to strengthen American commitment toward China.  Deng wanted the 
U.S. to closely align its interests with China’s, and deeper economic cooperation and, 
in particular, technology transfer through joint ventures and FDI would provide vital 
linkages between the two nations.  The evidence shows that Deng felt strongly that 
China needed advanced technology to modernize its defense and to prepare for 
China’s survival in the coming war with the Soviet Union that Deng thought was 
inevitable.  The U.S. was the source of the advanced technology that China needed, 
and the quickest and most effective way to obtain it would be through opening 
China’s door to U.S. direct investments, including joint ventures.  I argue that China’s 
1979 joint venture law was likely influenced by its urgent need to specifically attract 
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American technology to China in order to significantly strengthen its national 
security. 
Chapter 4: Direct Contact Between the United States and China 
The United States continued diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the 
legitimate government of China when the Chinese Communist Party won control of 
mainland China in 1949 after the Communist Revolution, and the U.S. refused to 
officially recognize the PRC.  After the Geneva Conference in 1954, communications 
between the United States and the PRC occurred via meetings from time to time in 
Poland and later through contacts in Romania, Pakistan, and France.253  Other 
contacts between Americans and Chinese occurred from time to time outside the U.S. 
or China.  For example, scholars Phillip Donald Grub and Jian Hai Lin report that 
China used trade fairs in Eastern Europe in the late 1960s to gather intelligence about 
American and European equipment.  Grub and Lin report that Chinese intelligence 
gathering came in contact with American representatives in Eastern Europe even 
more directly, citing two of what probably were many such experiences: 
 
In 1968, at the Budapest trade fair, five management and technical experts 
from the China exhibit team sat in on the seminars given by a U.S. business 
team that focused on managerial, production, and marketing techniques, as 
well as technology transfers.  A similar group participated in the seminars 
given at the autumn fair in Bucharest, Romania, in 1970.254 
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President Richard Nixon offered in 1967 that the American position toward 
China should be reoriented “to pull China back into the family of nations.”255  Long-
standing restrictions against travel to China were eased in 1970, and President Nixon 
sharply reduced restrictions on trade in 1971.  Trade officially resumed between the 
two countries on June 10, 1971.256   
President Nixon personally visited China in February 1972, thereby opening 
the door to the resumption of official relations between the U.S. and China.  Trade 
restrictions were relaxed further at the time of Nixon’s visit, so that the controls 
regarding trade with China were made to be the same as the controls regarding trade 
with the Soviet Union in February 1972.  According to the Business Asia journal, the 
first direct sale by an American company to the People’s Republic of China occurred 
because of President Nixon’s visit to China.  RCA sold USD $2.9 million worth of 
satellite communications equipment to the China National Machinery Import and 
Export Corporation so that images and news reports about Nixon’s visit could be 
broadcast from China.257  
China invited forty American businesspeople to attend the Canton Fair in 
China in April and May 1972, which was the first time American businesspeople 
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were officially invited to this important biannual Chinese trade fair.258  Business Asia 
reported that American attendees at the Canton trade fair were given preferential 
treatment by the Chinese organizers, including special invitations from the Canton 
fair committee, personal interpreters, and expedited access to appointments with 
Chinese trade officials.259  Though the number of American participants was much 
smaller the numbers from Japan, certain western European countries, and Australia, 
Business Asia reported that the small American group “stole the limelight.”  But no 
large trade deals were made.260  The Chinese showed interest in sophisticated 
American machinery but didn’t purchase any.261  This first involvement by American 
companies in the Canton trade fair, however, simply broke the ice.   
The spring 1972 Canton Trade Fair was followed by the first Chinese trade 
promotion in North America, held in the Canadian National Exhibition in August and 
early September 1972.  China’s import-export corporations and China’s international 
trade committee were well represented at this exhibition.  According to Business Asia, 
the Chinese representatives “extended an extremely cordial welcome to US 
executives” that travelled to Canada to attend this exhibition.262  Canada's first trade 
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fair in the PRC immediately followed this exhibition, and forty-five wholly U.S.-
owned firms and forty-six firms who were partially U.S.-owned participated.263 
Seventy-five American businesspeople attended the fall 1972 Canton trade 
fair, and Sobin Chemicals of Boston negotiated the first sale in a Canton fair of goods 
produced in the U.S. at this event.264  Each year thereafter, many American 
businesspeople traveled to China to attend these trade fairs, offering opportunities for 
direct contact between American businesspeople and Chinese trade officials.  The 
number of American participants each year climbed during the 1970s, reaching 630 in 
the spring of 1977.  In these interactions, Chinese participants expressed interest in 
American oilfield equipment and petroleum-related services, food processing 
equipment, chemical fertilizer ingredients, and other U.S. machinery and technology.  
American participants representing advanced technology included Exxon, Mobil, 
Caltex, Continental Oil, Caterpillar, Dow, Union Carbide, Westinghouse, Allied 
Chemical, and Pratt & Whitney.  Chinese interest in some products and technologies 
ran so high that the companies offering them were invited to Beijing for additional 
meetings.265   
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President Nixon’s trip resulted in the creation of the National Council for 
United States-China Trade (“NCUSCT”) in 1973 to promote trade between the U.S. 
and China. The White House and both the State Department and the Commerce 
Department encouraged the council’s activities.  On April 25, 1973, attorney and later 
vice-president of the NCUSCT Eugene A. Theroux circulated a draft list of activities 
for consideration by the Council.  It included a section titled “Foster Acceptance of 
U.S. Business Techniques,” which listed five items including “Joint-venturing 
agreements.”   Theroux noted that “The U.S. is not alone, of course, in seeking to 
gain acceptance in China for these or other unfamiliar business techniques.  But 
working with the Chinese, the National Council may be able to formulate acceptable 
licensing or joint-venture models, permitting U.S. companies first access on an 
experimental basis [emphasis added].”266   
Business Asia noted that the formation of the NCUSCT came at a time when 
China was “showing increased interest in US technology,” as evidenced by technical 
data sales to China.  The U.S. government approved seven sales of technology in 
1973 by mid-year compared to only two in 1971.267   
Twenty U.S. business leaders were selected by the Commerce Department to 
serve as the NCUSCT’s executive committee, and about 200 companies joined the 
council in its first year.  More than 300 business representatives attended the 
NCUSCT’s first conference on May 31, 1973.  The China Council for the Promotion 
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of International Trade (“CCPIT”), which had been established in 1952 to promote 
foreign trade, was the Chinese counterpart to the NCUSCT.268  Interactions between 
these two bodies allowed the Chinese government agencies that were responsible for 
foreign trade to gain insight into the interests of U.S. companies.269 
In a speech in New York in September 1973, NCUSCT president Christopher 
H. Phillips acknowledged the interest of the audience in the possibility of joint 
ventures between American firms and Chinese corporations by including in his 
remarks clarification that “…the Chinese presently have no interest in equity 
arrangements with U.S. or any other firm.”270  Other forms of investment in Chinese 
enterprises were also of interest to the members of the NCUSCT but not yet possible.  
Phillips circulated to the members of the NCUSCT delegation to China a list of five 
“Points Not To Be Discussed” during the November trip, one of which was “Direct 
Investment in the P.R.C.”  In this document he stated, “There is no practicable 
possibility of direct U.S. investment in the PRC at the present time, although many 
observers feel that arrangements resembling direct investment may become feasible.”  
Phillips referred to recent remarks to the NCUSCT by Professor Lucien Pye in which 
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Pye “pointed to China’s abundance of labor and great need for modern technology as 
forces which might compel something resembling foreign capital investment.”271  The 
members of the NCUSCT were polled to determine topics of interest to them to be 
discussed at the upcoming meeting in China.  Among the items identified by thirty-
nine respondents, General Motors Overseas Investment Corporation asked about “the 
PRC’s attitudes toward joint ventures between National Council members and 
agencies of the PRC” and “what government incentive legislation is contemplated to 
induce foreign investment in China?”272      
The first meeting of the NCUSCT and the CCPIT took place in China in 
November 1973.  This was the first official meeting between American 
businesspeople and trade officials of the PRC in twenty-five years.273  The U.S. 
participants included the chairman and chief executive officer of Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation, the chairman and chief executive officer of Deere & Company, 
the president of Cargill, Inc., and the chairman of J.C. Penney Company, Inc.  
Apparently the NCUSCT changed its position regarding the permissibility of 
speaking about direct investments in China.  These American businessmen made their 
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interests in joint ventures and close financial cooperation known in this first meeting.  
The first part of the NCUSCT agenda for this meeting addressed matters related to 
“Assistance to American importers and exporters interested in developing trade with 
China.”  The fourth section in this category was “Determine Acceptability of U.S. 
Techniques,” including “(i) licensing agreements; (ii) joint-venturing agreements; (iii) 
credit financing; (iv) turn-key projects; (v) plant sales and lease-back arrangements” 
and other items.274  Although the meeting minutes reported that the president of the 
CCPIT responded that “there was no possibility of joint ventures and no foreign 
ownership of any operations” in China at that time, this discussion in their first 
meeting clearly made the Chinese delegation aware of the U.S. side’s interest in these 
potential opportunities for direct investment and joint ventures.275  
American companies began exploring opportunities for sales of advanced 
technology products and technology transfer to China after this first NCUSCT 
meeting, and China encouraged the visits of American technical delegations.  Control 
Data Corporation (“CDC”) sent a team from its French subsidiary to China in 1974 to 
establish a contract for computer sales.  CDC subsequently sent a small American 
group to China in early 1975 to follow up, and a senior executive visited China twice 
in 1976.  A group of executives from Cummins Engine Company visited China in 
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1975 to explore opportunities for licensing their diesel engine technology to China, 
and they brought Cummins technical specialists with them when they visited again in 
1978.  The Foxboro Company began pursuing opportunities for its products in China 
in 1975 through its European subsidiaries in order to bypass U.S. export restrictions 
on the sophisticated technology that it manufactured.  Foxboro sent a delegation of 
senior executives to China in February 1979 to explore the possibility of a joint 
venture.  Ultimately the joint venture that was established in 1982 between Foxboro 
and the PRC was “the first U.S.-China joint venture involving the transfer of high 
technology.”  Westinghouse first sent a group of executives to China to explore 
technology transfer in 1974 in conjunction with a delegation from the NCUSCT, and 
more meetings took place between Westinghouse executives and Chinese 
counterparts between 1974 and 1979.  A fifteen-year licensing agreement for thermal 
power plant turbine generators was signed in 1980.  Westinghouse executives recalled 
the “Chinese ‘aggressiveness’ in wanting to do business with the United States.  
There appeared to be at that time an appreciation of America and American 
things.”276  In a news section that began with the line, “China is clearly quite anxious 
to create goodwill in the US,” Business Asia reported in April 1977 that China had 
invited three technical delegations to travel to China.  The three American delegations 
would represent food processing and packaging equipment, mining equipment, and 
oil equipment.277   
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U.S. oil companies and China both became particularly interested in 
developing China’s potential oil reserves with American technology.  Texas-based 
U.S. firms sold large amounts of oilfield equipment and technology to the Chinese 
between Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and 1975, and trade representatives from both 
the U.S. and China travelled regularly between the two countries.  However, an 
American oil company executive observed in 1975 that the Chinese were not 
interested in “…the joint ventures that are common between oil companies and other 
foreign governments” and did not want American companies as investors in Chinese 
enterprises.  Looking ahead, another executive offered, “If the Chinese are serious 
about becoming an oil power, then they’ll wind up buying in the United States—not 
in Japan or Europe—because they know we are leaders in the business and they 
always want the best.”278 
The warming of relations between the United States and China literally 
opened the door for greater contact between American and Chinese people.  
According to historian Harry Harding, between 1,500 and 3,000 Americans visited 
China in 1972 alone, and 15,000 Americans visited China between the resumption of 
contact between the two countries and 1977.279  American delegations to China 
represented a wide diversity of interests in addition to businesspeople, including 
students and academic groups, leftist as well as mainstream American political 
groups, and groups associated with artistic interests.280   Librarian Kathlin Smith 
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documented that delegations of American and Chinese scientists traveled between the 
two countries in 1973 and 1974.281  Four years before he rose to the pinnacle of 
power as leader of China, Deng Xiaoping met in China with U.S. businesspeople, a 
delegation of American university presidents, and American political leaders in the 
fall of 1974.282  Financial institutions sensed the emerging interest in expanding 
business with China.  Business Asia reported in April 1977 that Bank of America was 
given permission by China to hold its annual board meeting in May in Peking 
(Beijing).283  
Perhaps the most important delegation to visit China just prior to the reforms 
was the one led by President Jimmy Carter’s science advisor, Frank Press, in July 
1978.  According to political scientist Robert S. Ross, Press and the delegation he led 
received “the warmest reception that a U.S. delegation had ever received in China 
since 1949.”  Most importantly, Ross reported that Deng Xiaoping in particular 
warmly welcomed Press and “broached the prospect of joint economic ventures in 
China” with him, which was the first time Deng raised this subject with a U.S. 
official.284    
Warmer relations also opened the door for Chinese visitors to come to the 
U.S., which gave them an opportunity to see the modernization of the U.S. and its 
technology firsthand.  A delegation from China’s Techimport group visited advanced 
                                                
281 Kathlin Smith, “The Role of Scientists in Normalizing U.S.-China Relations: 
1965-1979,” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 866 (December 1998): 
120, 125. 
282 Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, 86-87. 
283 Business Asia, “China Letter: Promising First-Half Canton Fair, Outlook for Sino-
US Relations,” IX, no. 17 (April 29, 1977): 132. 
284 Robert S. Ross, Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-
1989 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 158-159. 
 104 
 
machine tool manufacturers in the U.S. in 1976.285  One thousand Chinese citizens 
visited the U.S. in 1977 alone.286  Business Asia announced in 1977 that the NCUSCT 
would host a visit to the U.S. starting in September of that year by a fifteen-member 
team from the CCPIT.287 
Deng Xiaoping made his first visit to the United States during April 4-16, 
1974 to address the United Nations.288  His address on April 10 was well received, 
particularly by developing countries, and he took the opportunity to meet with leaders 
of other countries while at the UN.289  American technology and modernity made a 
tremendous impression on Deng during his stay in New York.  According to historian 
Benjamin Yang, who attended college in China with Deng's youngest son, Deng 
Zhifang:290 
 
Deng [Xiaoping] did not leave New York immediately after the UN 
conference.  He decided to stay on for a few more days touring the city…The 
Broadway skyscrapers and Times Square subway station seemed awesome to 
him.  The sharp contrast between American progress and Chinese 
backwardness was too obvious to deny.  He would never afterward talk lightly 
about catching up with America in a few years.291 
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Deng’s first priority when he had free time in New York on the weekend was 
to visit Wall Street.  According to historian Ezra Vogel, “To Deng, Wall Street was 
the symbol not only of American capitalism but also of American economic 
might.”292  
Former British Ambassador Richard Evans argued: 
 
[Deng’s] visit to New York was important…it gave him his first sight of the 
modern Western world…There is nothing in the published record about what 
Deng thought of New York.  But he would have been unique if he had not 
been impressed.  Nothing in his experience of Paris in the early 1920s, or of 
Moscow in the 1950s and 1960s, could have prepared him for its skyline, its 
opulence and its bustle.  Four days in Manhattan would have brought home to 
him more forcefully than any amount of reading how far China had to go 
before it could claim to be a modern country.293   
 
  
Deng met Henry Kissinger for the first time and dined with him while he was 
in New York.294  According to Ezra Vogel, Kissinger observed that Deng “was 
already thinking about what improved relations with the United States could do for 
China’s modernization” during that first interaction between Kissinger and Deng in 
1974.295 Reflecting on that first meeting, Kissinger observed that “Deng’s position on 
Sino-American relations was closely related to his views regarding China’s evolution.  
Mao and Zhou had conducted rapprochement with the United States largely on 
foreign policy and security grounds.  Deng always treated close relations with 
America as a necessary component of Chinese modernization [emphasis added].” 
According to Kissinger, “…Deng thought friendly relations with America were 
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needed for the sake of China’s domestic evolution…In pursuit of economic progress 
Deng strove for a significant improvement in the well-being of the Chinese people.  
American technology and economic cooperation were essential for the economic and 
social reform to which he was committed [emphasis added].”296 
Long-serving Chinese premier Zhou Enlai spoke of how far China had fallen 
behind the technologically developed countries of the world in one of his last public 
appearances before his death.  In January 1975, at the Fourth National People’s 
Congress, he articulated China’s need to quickly modernize its agriculture, industry, 
national defense, and science and technology, a challenge that he called the “Four 
Modernizations.”  But Professor David Shambaugh argued, “Deng drafted the speech 
and crafted the programme.”297  The Four Modernizations served as the battle cry of 
the reform era.  Frequent references to the need for economic reforms to accelerate 
the achievement of the Four Modernizations were subsequently made throughout the 
reform period.  By August 1975, Deng had formulated the essence of the redirection 
that eventually transformed China and the world.  In a speech to the State Council on 
August 18, 1975, titled “Some Comments on Industrial Development,” Deng 
asserted: 
 
We should introduce new technology and equipment from other countries and 
expand imports and exports.  Foreign countries all attach great significance to 
the introduction of new equipment from abroad.  Take their products apart, 
and you’ll find that many parts or components are also made abroad…All in 
all, we should strive to expand exports in exchange for high-grade, high-
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precision, advanced technology and equipment so as to speed up the technical 
transformation of our industries and to raise the productivity of labour.298 
 
Deng Xiaoping made reference to his earlier interest in reforms in a speech on 
September 16, 1978, just three months before the first reforms were adopted. Deng 
said: 
 
Unless the Central Committee of the Party is prepared to rethink issues and is 
prepared to act in the light of present conditions, many questions will never be 
posed or resolved.  For example, while Comrade Mao was still living we 
thought about expanding economic and technical exchanges with other 
countries.  We wanted to develop economic and trade relations with certain 
capitalist countries and even to absorb foreign capital and undertake joint 
ventures.  But the necessary conditions were not present, because at the time 
an embargo was being imposed on China…After several years of effort, we 
have secured international conditions that are far better than before; they 
enable us to make use of capital from foreign countries and of their advanced 
technology and experience in business management.299    
 
The U.S. led its allies to impose a trade embargo on China in 1950 after 
Chinese troops began supporting North Korea in the Korean War.  However, the 
other countries began resuming trade with China beginning in 1957 and only the U.S. 
continued to impose an embargo after 1958.300  The U.S. embargo was not terminated 
until 1971.  Did Deng’s remarks just three months before the adoption in December 
of China’s first sweeping reforms imply that China was specifically targeting those 
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reforms to open opportunities “to absorb foreign capital and undertake joint 
ventures” with American companies? 
When Deng triumphantly returned to the U.S. in 1979, he was asked what he 
wanted to see.  Deng replied that he wanted to see “space and your advanced 
technology.”  He was subsequently taken to the Johnson Space Center and to the Ford 
and Boeing advanced technology factories.  An American official who was 
accompanying Deng was reported as saying, “They [the Chinese] perceive us as the 
most advanced society, and they idealize us and look for magic coming out of their 
new [U.S.] connection.”301  
Many of the American leaders that met with Deng Xiaoping and other 
Chinese leaders in the mid- to late 1970s noted their specific interest in gaining access 
to American technology.  Jimmy Carter recorded in his memoirs regarding 1977 that, 
“Although the very top leaders refused to visit the United States as long as there was 
an ambassador from Taiwan in Washington, they seemed eager for a few of their 
cabinet-level officials to come to discuss such matters as commercial trade and 
possible future access by China to United States technology.”302  Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter’s National Security Advisor, noted that Deng 
“stressed China’s interest in obtaining greater access to American technology” when 
the two men met in May 1978.303 And Henry Kissinger asserted that “[Deng] based 
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his reform on market economics—which he called socialist market economics—and 
friendly relations with the United States.”304 
In conclusion, the exchanges that occurred in the early 1970s between 
American contacts and their Chinese counterparts made clear to the Chinese that 
American firms were interested in cooperating in joint ventures and other forms of 
FDI in China.  Chinese technologists recognized the superiority of American 
technology.  Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng, Chou Enlai and other Chinese leaders 
recognized that China had fallen significantly behind the developed world and 
desperately needed to accelerate its importation of advanced foreign technology in 
order to modernize its agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and 
technology.  Deng and Hua recognized the need for economic reforms to enable faster 
importation of foreign technology in the mid-1970s but were held back by political 
enemies.  I argue, therefore, that Deng, Hua, and other Chinese leaders recognized 
that they needed deeper access to American technology than normal trade relations 
would facilitate.  I also argue that Deng and Hua and other Chinese leaders likely 
launched their 1979 joint venture law with the goal of specifically attracting 
American investments and technology to China. 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusions 
Negotiations on the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China 
took place through the 1970s.305  According to Jimmy Carter’s notes, the U.S. and 
China agreed to a draft communiqué that confirmed the upcoming normalization of 
relations by the U.S. with China on December 13, 1978.  China announced its first 
economic reforms four days later.306  Business Asia announced in January 1979 that 
China was willing to consider proposals for joint ventures between foreign and 
Chinese entities, but American companies were reluctant to pursue joint ventures 
without having guidelines and boundaries established in Chinese law.307  China 
published its new law allowing joint ventures with foreign firms on July 8, 1979.  The 
new joint venture law stated that China expected “truly advanced” technology and 
equipment to be supplied by foreign partners to joint ventures and warned that 
penalties would be charged to foreign companies who deceptively provided old 
technology.308   China then created the China International Trust and Investment 
Corporation (CITIC) in 1979 to lead the development of joint ventures between 
Chinese and foreign entities and to bring foreign technology and investment to China.  
CITIC’s first client was an American firm, E-S Pacific Corporation, which wanted to 
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invest in several entities in China.309  President Jimmy Carter normalized diplomatic 
relations with China in 1979.  Professor Robert Kleinberg noted that more than $2 
billion USD flowed into China in foreign direct investments by the end of 1981, and 
most of those investments came from the U.S.310  
As the U.S. government debated granting Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) 
status to China in mid-1979, a growing number of members of Congress argued that 
if the U.S. granted MFN to China, it had to also extend MFN to the U.S.S.R.311  
However, efforts at détente between the United States and the Soviet Union came to a 
halt in December 1979 when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.  President Carter 
renewed MFN status to China in 1980, which removed most restrictions on China’s 
trade with the U.S. and enhanced China’s ability to export to the U.S.  However, 
because of the new tensions between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., MFN status was not 
renewed to the Soviet Union.312 
Mao deeply instilled in the Chinese culture and the CCP administration a 
strong focus on self-reliance.  How could China acquire foreign technology in order 
to address its weaknesses but retain self-reliance and avoid being overrun by foreign 
"imperialists" like it was in the second half of the 19th century?  It is in this context 
that it is important to assess China’s alternatives to the United States as suppliers of 
advanced technology in 1979.  Some countries, most significantly Japan, had 
maintained active trade relations with China during the period between 1950 and 
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1971 when the U.S. prohibited trade with China, thereby potentially making them 
preferred technology partners in 1979 compared to the United States.  Japan restored 
diplomatic relations with China in 1972 when the U.S. had not yet restored 
diplomatic relations with China.   Japan certainly possessed advanced technology in 
1979.  Deng acknowledged the high degree of modernization he observed when he 
visited Japan in 1978.313  But Japan’s technology leading up to 1979 was largely 
derived from American technology.  Furthermore, political scientist Margaret Pearson 
noted that Japan’s government discouraged investment in China during the 1970s and 
1980s.  Japanese companies eagerly engaged in very profitable trade with China, but 
were more wary at that time of engaging in joint ventures than American or European 
firms.  Japan was interested in selling to China but did not want to share advanced 
Japanese technology with China in 1979, fearful of creating a competitor.  Although 
the shifting of the yen exchange rate made low-cost manufacturing in China more 
attractive to Japanese companies in the mid-1980s, Japan preferred to export to China 
from Japan in the late 1970s order to protect its proprietary technology.314  As a 
result, Japan was initially “extremely cautious” about investing in China when the 
Open Door policies were first launched.315  
In a widely cited paper, Kiyoshi Kojima asserted that Japanese technology 
transfer to developing countries emphasized labor-intensive, low-level technology, 
while American technology transfer to developing countries emphasized highly 
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advanced technology.  He explained that the Japanese technology transfer 
relationship typically took the form of Japan supplying the raw materials and 
equipment, providing extensive local management in the foreign region, training the 
foreign workforce in basic, low-technology standardized work skills, and then 
providing the end market for the final manufactured products back in Japan.  Japan 
did not want to transfer advanced technology to developing countries, preferring to 
keep that technology in Japan.  But he noted that American technology transfer 
typically resulted in the transfer of high-level, advanced technology to both 
developing and developed economies where the American supplier saw an 
opportunity to gain market share in the local foreign market.316  I argue that the 
Chinese reformers very likely initially saw the Japanese approach to technology 
transfer as one of establishing long-term dependency on Japan for raw materials, 
proprietary technology, and demand, thereby returning to allowing an “imperialist” 
relationship with Japan to again develop in China.  The American approach, on the 
other hand, would allow Chinese technologists to learn and eventually replicate 
advanced American technology, which was China’s ultimate objective.  As China 
opened its door to foreign advanced technology, it simultaneously began to 
aggressively promote the development and advancement of its domestic science and 
technology capabilities, thereby increasing its ability to absorb and ultimately 
reproduce advanced Western technology.317  China deployed other means after 1979 
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to largely protect its domestic market from American and other foreign suppliers, but 
that is an important and complex subject that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, China’s other large trading partners in the late 1970s did not 
have the same level of interest as the U.S. in joint ventures and direct investment in 
China in the late 1970s.  The government of Taiwan prohibited investments in China 
until 1987, and Hong Kong had little incentive to invest in China until the 1980s 
because of its already low labor costs and active trade with China.318  Eventually 
Hong Kong became the largest source of foreign direct investment in China in the 
1980s, but its investments were typically in small, labor-intensive, assembly 
operations, which didn’t provide the advanced technology that China sought to 
accomplish its “Four Modernizations.”319 
France and Germany possessed advanced technology, but their technology 
level between 1968-1978 was inferior to that of the U.S.  Partnering again with the 
Soviet Union was out of the question--the U.S.S.R. and China were bitter enemies at 
the time of the reforms (but China and the Soviet Union later repaired their 
relationship after the U.S. restored diplomatic relations with China in 1979 and after 
hostilities increased between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the 1980s).  By opening 
China to American FDI and joint ventures and utilizing the technology so acquired to 
build an export-oriented economy, China was able to draw in advanced technology 
that it could learn and copy, while building its foreign reserves that it could use to 
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acquire more technology, all while protecting its domestic market and avoiding a 
return to “imperialist” domination.   
The U.S. had looked at China as a vast potential market since the middle of 
the 19th century.  China was the largest unsaturated market for advanced technology 
left in the world in the 1970s, and American business leaders were keenly interested 
in tapping into that market.320  The U.S. had already demonstrated its interest and 
capabilities in moving technology through FDI into developing nations through its 
activities in the East Asian Tiger countries.  Chinese reformers and decision makers 
could take two lessons from the U.S. histories in the Soviet Bloc and in the East 
Asian “Tiger” economies.  The first was that American companies were not only 
willing but were eager to enter into technology transfer relationships, whether by 
setting up joint ventures, selling technology licenses, or by establishing foreign-based 
wholly owned subsidiaries into which advanced technology would be transferred 
from American parents.  The second lesson was that American companies were quite 
willing for their foreign technology partners to build export-oriented economies 
utilizing American technology, even for export back to the United States, if the 
foreign partner provided low-cost labor that resulted in higher profits for the 
American partner than U.S.-based manufacturing provided.  While Chinese reformers 
certainly wished to open China to mutually beneficial technology transfer 
relationships with all of the advanced economies of the world, I argue that Chinese 
reformers likely wanted to specifically gain access to advanced American technology. 
The evidence strongly suggests that they also wanted to pull American technology 
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into China in order to advance China’s national security and counter the threat posed 
by the Soviet Union. 
Chinese reformers studied the experiences of the Soviet Union’s allies in 
Eastern Europe and saw that foreign capital and joint ventures had been utilized to the 
benefit of those economies.  Even more importantly, they studied the experiences of 
the modern and rapidly growing East Asian “Tigers,” and certainly they saw that the 
American capital and advanced technology that had been gained through joint 
ventures and direct investment benefitted those economies by expanding their export 
base.  American businesspeople, particularly those who served on the NCUSCT and 
those who had experience with foreign direct investments and joint ventures in other 
countries, made clear to their Chinese counterparts that they were ready to enter 
China. 
And in fact American investments flowed to China after the reforms of 1979. 
According to Professor Philip Donald Grub and economist Jian Hai Lin: 
 
During the early period (from 1979 to 1986), U.S. investment in China was 
strong…In contrast to Japanese conservatism, U.S. firms were more 
aggressive toward the Chinese market in the first half of the decade.  Their 
competitive advantage in technology and management, together with their 
eagerness to exploit new business opportunities in this vase and untapped 
market, led to a surge in their investment activities in these years.321  
 
 
A 2012 study reported that annual foreign direct investment into China 
reached $100 million in 1979, climbed to $1 billion in 1984, and reached around $40 
billion in 1995.  It has remained above $40 billion each year since then.322  
                                                
321 Grub and Lin, 84. 
322 Hale and Long, Foreign Direct Investment in China, 2. 
 117 
 
China’s post-1978 economic development dramatically changed world trade, 
and in particular its trade relations with the U.S. China’s economy is now the second 
largest in the world; its gross domestic product is more than ten times larger than it 
was in 1978; and it is the largest exporter in the world, with the U.S. its largest export 
destination.323  China’s trade balance with the U.S. shifted from a U.S. surplus of 
$467 million USD in 1978 to a Chinese surplus of $174.4 billion USD today.324 
China’s growth after 1979 is the greatest story of economic transformation in 
the modern age, and its successful transformation was substantially influenced by the 
importation of advanced technology through joint ventures and foreign direct 
investment.  Defining the influences that led China’s reformers to open China to 
foreign joint ventures and direct investment is a meaningful contribution to historical 
scholarship.  While I realize that attempting to analyze the influences that led to 
China’s 1979 joint venture law is problematic without accessing Chinese primary 
sources, particularly the personal records of the Chinese reformers, I believe the 
evidence that I was able to access was compelling.  I argue that the opportunity to 
specifically gain access to American technology through joint ventures and FDI was 
likely the primary influence that led China to issue its 1979 law that opened China to 
foreign joint ventures and FDI. 
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